Boca Raton Divorce Lawyer Blog

Relocation, Relocation, Relocation

Fri, 17 Feb 2012 10:38:08 -0500

In today's economy, we see more and more people struggling to find employment. As a result, people are searching over a broader market area then they would normally be looking at, and as a result, more employment opportunities become available to individuals in other states.

This brings up the ever difficult decision a trial judge must face when a parent seeks to relocate with the minor children to another state, or to a new residence that is a substantial distance from their current residence.

Most frequently this situation will arise due to new employment opportunities that may be available to one of the parents.

Relocation of minor children is governed by Florida Statute 61.13001. The provisions of this statute will be applicable whenever a parent wishes to relocate from their current residence, and if the new residence is more than 50 miles from the current residence.

The consequences of not complying with the provisions of the statute could lead to some rather unpleasant consequences for the relocating parent, so it is extremely important to have a clear understanding of all of the provisions of that statute.

There are not only important factual considerations for the court to consider, but procedural ones as well. The petition that is filed, which seeks the ultimate grant of permission to relocate, must contain specific information, including the address of the proposed new residence, the new telephone number, and all the appropriate information regarding the new employment offer. There must be specific warnings to the other parent, in bold type, of the consequences they could suffer by not timely responding to the petition.

If anyone has had any prior experience with the judicial system, the have probably discovered that the judges are busy, and that it takes an extended amount of time to resolve issues that are pending before the courts.

What happens then, if an employment opportunity must be acted on promptly and access to the courts would not be swift? There is a remedy provided under the statute for this very situation.

Under Florida law, if you file a motion seeking expedited relief, for permission to relocate on a temporary basis while your petition is pending, you are entitled to a hearing on that matter within thirty (30) days of filing that request. What I do as a matter of course, is to file that motion right along with the petition, and obtain that hearing very quickly.

These types of cases require close attention to all the details, since the court is guided as to what will be in the best interests of the children. The proper presentation of the relevant evidence and documentation to support the claim for relocation can only increase the likelihood of success in these proceedings.

How to vacate a paternity decree in one easy step!

Wed, 19 Jan 2011 00:00:07 -0500

Yes, it is possible to have the court vacate a paternity decree after it has been entered, even if years have passed by. The remedy is found in section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2006).

This statute creates circumstances under which a male may disestablish paternity or terminate a child support obligation when he receives "newly discovered evidence" demonstrating that he is not the biological father of the child. Section 742.18(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006).

The statute does not require a petitioner to prove fraud or duress when attempting to disestablish paternity. Rather, the statute clearly establishes the necessary allegations, requisite trial court findings, and conduct that would prohibit disestablishing paternity. Section 742.18(1)-(3), Fla. Stat.(2006).

The recent case of Johnston v. Johnston, 979 So2d 337 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) sets forth a very clear explanation of the statute and how it works. I would recommend this case to anyone facing this particular situation.

For further information on this statute and possible assistance, you can contact me at www.alanburtonlaw.com.

"Primary residential parent" abolished in Florida

Mon, 17 Jan 2011 00:00:01 -0500

In 2008, the Florida legislature made substantial changes to the law in reference to minor children. The primary and most significant changes made by the 2008 amendments to section 61.13, Florida Statutes, was the abolishment of the terminology of "primary residential parent."
The effective date of the amendments were on October 1, 2008, and the changes were to have prospective application only. The changes could not be utilized to effectuate any modifications to agreements that were previously entered into by individuals prior to October 1, 2008. See the case of Hahn v. Hahn, (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

The Hahn case is an interesting case to read. It clarifies many points of law that have arisen under the 2008 amendments to section 61.13. Although the designation of "primary residential parent" has been removed from the statute, the trial court is still required to consider the best interests of the child if called upon to create a parenting plan. The trial court must still "determine all matters relating to parenting and timesharing of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the child. Section 61.13(2)(c)1., Florida Statute (2008)(amended October 1, 2008).

The Hahn case involved modification proceedings that were filed two years after the final judgment was entered, and before the effective date of the new statute. It was error on the part of the trial judge to apply retroactively the provisions of the new statute.

Is jewelry a marital asset and how is it valued?

Fri, 14 Jan 2011 00:01:00 -0500

Jewelry is clearly a marital asset if acquired during the course of the marriage, and it is therefore subject to equitable distribution.

Placing a value on jewelry is a more difficult question. There is ample case law that sets forth the principle that valuations must be based upon competent evidence. Noone v. Noone, 727 So.2d 972, (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); see also Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).

In Lassett v. Lassett, 768 So.2d 472 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), the husband tesified that his wife's jewelry was valued at $10,000. There was no other evidence. The trial court stated that this was not competent evidence as to value. His unsupported opinion as to the value of the jewelry is not sufficient to warrant the distribution of that amount to the wife.

The only evidence the wife had as to the value of the husband's jewelry in the Noone case was that apparently he had told her it was worth $10,000 at some point in time. This was not considered competent evidence by the court. Alternatively, the husband valued his own jewelry at $1,500 on his financial affidavit, which the court deemed to be competent evidence.

Relocation decisions cannot be deferred

Wed, 12 Jan 2011 00:00:10 -0500

Florida, and in particular south Florida, is suffering from the economic downturn experienced by the rest of the country. Foreclosures are at an all time high in Palm Beach and Broward County; families are losing their homes at an unprecedented pace.

This situation makes relocation a very real possibility for many families after divorce. Single parents are looking for better opportunities for themselves as well as for their children. As a result, trial judges are dealing more frequently with the very difficult issue of relocation. Relocation cases are extremely difficult since most often times there is little to negotiate and there is no room to compromise. One parent wants to go, while the other would prefer that his or her children remain in close proximity.

Relocation cases must be dealt with when the issue arises; it is not appropriate for the court to consider a relocation case today when the anticipated move will occur sometime in the future. See Sylvester v. Sylvester, 992 So.2d 296 (Fla 1st DCA 2008).

The law on this issue is supported by substantial case law. When a cause involving child custody is presented to the trial court, "the trial court is required to make a final determination on that issue at that time." Martinez v. Martinez, 573 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

The court in the Sylvester case made it very clear that it would not be appropriate for a trial court to look into its crystal ball and determine whether relocation would be in the best interest of the child at some time in the future. The proper cause of action is to determine whether relocation is presently appropriate and consider future relocation based on the circumstances existing at that time.

Retroactive alimony is there for the asking!

Mon, 10 Jan 2011 00:00:10 -0500

The entitlement to an award of retroactive alimony is a right, and not a privilege, if the circumstances support the award. See alimony update for additional information on this subject.

The case of Gremel v. Gremel, 35 Fla. L. weekly D2291a (Fla. 2nd DCA 2010) illustrates the point. Mrs. Gremel separated from her husband in December 2003. She did not file her divorce petition until March 15, 2007, more than three years after her initial separation. On April 1, 2008, the trial court entered a temporary order requiring Mr. Gremel to pay his wife $2950 per month, as of April 1, 2008.

The appellate court stated that Mrs. Gremel may very well be entitled to retroactive alimony from March 15, 2007, the date of the filing of her petition for dissolution of marriage. See Valentine v. Van Sickle, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D1663 (Fla. 2d DCA Jul. 28, 2010).

The trial court was instructed to consider the wife's needs and the husband's ability to pay during the retroactive time period sought by the wife in determining whether the wife's retroactive alimony request is appropriate.

Supervised visitation and hearsay

Fri, 07 Jan 2011 00:00:10 -0500

Obviously, the courts won't hesitate to enter any orders when necessary to protect minor children from harm. This would include orders for supervised visitation against a parent if the circumstances warranted this type of relief.

In the divorce proceedings between N.W. and M.W., 41 So.3d 383 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2010), the mother alleged that the father was sexually abusing the parties' daughter. As a result of those allegations, the father was restricted to supervised visits with his daughter. The father subsequently moved for unsupervised visits, and the mother moved to admit the child's hearsay testimony regarding the sexual abuse pursuant to section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (2009). The court denied the mother's request, and re-instated the father's unsupervised visitation.

The mother filed a timely appeal, and the appellate court reinstated the order for supervised visitation. The court said that the trial court had applied the incorrect standard of law.

The proper standard for admitting hearsay statements of children was succinctly stated in State v. Townsend, 635 So.2d 949, 954 (Fla. 1994). The trial court has responsibility in ensuring that child hearsay statements satisfy a strict standard of reliability before admitting them as evidence. The trial court must make findings that satisfy two criteria:" (1) the source of the information through which the statement was reported must indicate trustworthiness; and (2) the time, content, and circumstances of the statement must reflect that the statement provides sufficient safeguards of reliability."

As the Townsend case makes clear, the focus on these types of cases is on the person to whom the statement was made by the child and the manner in which the statement was made.

The appellate court also noted that the mother sought to introduce statements made by the child to the mother, the grandmother, a therapist, and a family friend. The trial court's order was reversed because, as the appellate court found, the trial court made no findings with regard to any of these sources and also failed to address the individual statements and circumstances under which they were made.

The trial court neglected to follow the mandates of the Townsend case, as established by the Supreme Court of Florida.

If you or any of your family members require expertise in the admissability of hearsay evidence in order to protect a child from harm, you can contact me directly by clicking on my name, Alan R. Burton, Esq.

Civil contempt in divorce proceedings for non payment of child support

Wed, 05 Jan 2011 00:00:10 -0500

Failing to pay a court ordered child support obligation can land the non complying parent in jail. However, there are certain procedures that must be followed before incarceration can occur.

An order of civil contempt for failure to pay child support requires findings of wilful failure to pay ordered amounts. If incarceration is to be orderd as a result of finding wilful contempt, the court must then make the affirmative finding that the contemnor possessses the present ability to comply with the purge. Miller v. Murrah, 14 So.3d 1019 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); Brown v. Brown, 658 So.2d 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

The key too these cases requires that an order be in writing, and that these findings must be clearly set forth in the order. Alan R. Burton, Esq. is well qualified to assist you in preparation of appropriate orders for this purpose.

Todd Alan Grant was successful in securing his release from custody after having been jailed for non-payment of support. In his case, there was never a written order entered, and he was promptly released. Grant v. Department of Revenue on behalf of Heather R. Kopp, 27 So.3d 190 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

Rafael Carbonell had much the same luck as Mr. Grant. He was also incarcerated for non-payment of support, but upon filing an appeal, he was also promptly released. The order which had him jailed failed to make the specific affirmative finding that he had the present ability to comply with the purge amount as set by the court. Carbonell v. Department of Revenue on Behalf of Deydry Capella, 30 So.3d 664 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

If in fact there is wilful noncompliance with a child support order, it is incumbent upon the trial judge to be meticulous in his or her findings. The order directing incarceration must be carefully drafted if it is to withstand any subsequent attack.

Is a hearing required before a court can vacate temporary injunctions against domestic violence?

Mon, 03 Jan 2011 00:00:01 -0500

The issue of vacating temporary injunctions against domestic violence was dealt with in Schock v. Schock, 979 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

In this case the father had obtained injunctions against his child's mother, along with another one against her boyfriend. The allegations made included neglect and abuse against his daughter. The duty judge found the allegations appropriate for the issuance of an injunction, that the child involved was the victim of domestic violence, and was in immediate and present danger, and he issued the orders accordingly.

In response to all this, the mother filed an Emergency Motion For Return of Child and Change of Custody in the dissolution of marriage action that had been filed. Two days after the mother had filed her motions, the trial judge assigned to the divorce case entered two orders vacating the injunctions that had been previously entered by the duty judge.

The judge decided on his own that the allegations made by the father in his application for an injunction against the child's mother were conclusory, and those which were made against the boyfriend were based upon hearsay.

On appeal, the trial judge was reversed. The appellate court stated that once an injunction is issued under Section 741.30, Florida Statutes, the injunction cannot be vacated without a hearing. Sanchez v. State, 785 So.2d 672, 676 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

As a result of this ruling, the temporary injunctions were re-instated, and the trial court was instructed to conduct an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the motions filed by the mother. See also White v. Cannon, 778 So.2d 467, 467-68 (Fla. 3rd CA 2001).

For further information, advise, or any questions on this topic, please click the following link: www.alanburtonlaw.com

Temporary support....how much is really needed?

Fri, 31 Dec 2010 00:00:10 -0500

In a case recently decided, a wife was awarded an astounding sum of $75,000.00 per month for temporary support for herself and her child. Stanton v. Stanton, 2D10-919 (2010).

The appellate court said this amount simply could not stand, as the amount was not supported by competent substantial evidence.

The trial court should consider the standard of living in addition to the need of one spouse and the other spouse's ability to pay. de Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 19 So.3d 1110, 1113 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

Here, in this case, the wife had testified that her monthly expenses totaled $44,029, including those of her child. Her financial affidavit also indicated her monthly expenses to total $44,029. It was clear to the appellate court that the trial judge had erred in making an award of $75,000 per month for the wife when the evidence reflected that the wife's needs were $44,029. Also CLICK HERE to visit my site for the most updated information on the new alimony laws in Florida.

The appellate court gave further instructions to the trial court that the award to the wife must be based upon her needs, and should not attempt "to fund the enjoyment of every
little luxury enjoyed before divorce." Levine v. Levine, 964 So.2d 741, 742-43 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

The purpose of alimony is to provide for the less wealthy spouse above bare subsistence levels, not to fund the enjoyment of every little luxury enjoyed before divorce. "Fixing alimony at a profligate standard of living is to turn alimony into a lottery. That is one reason why the standard of living during marriage is not a super factor trumping all other factors in awarding alimony. Jaffy v. Jaffy, 965 So.2d 825, 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Although the sum of $44,029, awarded to the wife on a monthly basis was certainly not a nominal amount, this case still clearly points out that the standard for temporary relief is clearly the needs of the requesting spouse versus the ability of the other spouse to meet those needs.

Financial affidavits in divorce proceedings

Wed, 29 Dec 2010 00:00:01 -0500

In every dissolution of marriage action filed in Boca Raton, Fort Lauderdale, or anywhere else throughout the state of Florida, the parties are required to file a financial affidavit which details their income, expenses, assets and liabilities. The importance of filing this document in an accurate manner cannot be over emphasized.

What happens when assets are not disclosed by a party to the divorce proceeding?

In Romero v. Romero, 959 So.2d 333 (Fla. 3DCA 2007), the husband failed to disclose stock options he had received over the course of the marriage, and which the wife was unaware of. They were ultimately discovered by her after the proceedings concluded, and she subsequently tried to reach them through the use of a constructive trust.

The trial court concluded that these options were marital assets because they were awarded to the husband based upon his past qualifications and experience over the course of the marriage.

The wife testified that had she known about them, she would have wanted half; that she would have exercised them; she would have sold them, and would have used the proceeds to reduce the mortgage on her home.

The decision of the trial court, awarding the wife half of the options, was ultimately reversed on appeal. The appellate court ruled that the wife failed to establish the elements of fraud, and "impermissibly stacked inference upon inference, with the full benefit of hindsight, culminating in a final judgment based solely upon speculation."

What makes this case rather interesting is the fact that neither party completed a thorough examination of their assets when they drafted their marital settlement agreement. Given theses circumstances, the court concluded that the husband did not commit any fraud in not disclosing his stock options.

It is important to recognize that a petition to set aside a final judgment in a divorce case cannot be done simply because of non-disclosure on a financial affidavit. There must be more. The moving party must still establish a ground for setting aside the judgment pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.540(b)(3).

In other words, a movant must show not just that the affidavit contained a false statement of a material fact, but also that it was fraudulent, i.e., that the person making the false statement knew that it was false, that the false statement was made with the intent that the other party would rely on the false statement, and that the other party actually relied on the false statement and was thereby prejudiced. Ward v. Atl. Sec. Bank, 777 So.2d 1144, 1146 (Fla. 3d DC 2001).

The moral of the story is to exercise due diligence in not only completing your financial affidavit, but to also conduct your own extensive investigation into discovering the nature and extent of all marital assets. For more valuable information regarding this subject or any other subject that you may have an interest in, please click the following link which will take you over to my site, www.alanburtonlaw.com.

The importance of the valuation date in dissolution of marriage actions

Mon, 27 Dec 2010 00:00:01 -0500

In every dissolution of marriage action, marital assets must be identified and valued. The critical question that is in dispute often times becomes as of what date are those assets to be valued?

Section 61.075(6), Florida Statutes (2004), provides a bright line rule for classifying marital assets and liabilities. Absent a valid separation agreement, the cut-off date for classifying marital assets is the date of filing the petition for dissolution of marriage. Schmitz v. Schmitz, 950 So.2d 462, 463 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Often times, it is a much easier task to identify those assets which are marital, then it is to value them. The case of Odak v. Vitrano, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D1957a (2010) is instructive on this point.

Another point of contention in this case involved the severance payment received by the husband. That payment was substantial. However, since the right to receive the payment did not come into existence until after the date the petition for dissolution of marriage was filed, the court had properly classified the severance payment as a non marital asset.

In this case the husband was an expert in "turning around" troubled companies. He was hired by Wild Oats Markets, Inc. as its president and chief operating officer for a number of years. He had received stock options from the company which he exercised during the marriage. The trial court chose to value those assets as of the date of the trial, as opposed to the date of filing the petition for dissolution of marriage.

The stock that the husband received apparently grew in value by a considerable amount between the date of filing the petition for dissolution of marriage annd the date of trial. The husband had argued that the increase in the value of the stock was occasioned by his post petition efforts to make the company more efficient and profitable, and therefore the proper valuation date should have been the date of filing the petition for dissolution of marriage, rather than the date of trial. It would have been unfair for the wife to benefit from his efforts made after the date of filing.

Although his arguument was very logical, the court sided with the wife with this issue, since there was conflicting evidence presented at trial as to what exactly was the cause of the stock rising in value. The trial court is afforded a wide latitude of discretion, and unless that discretion is abused, the decision cannot be reverersed on appeal.

The impact of divorce on children

Sun, 26 Dec 2010 00:00:01 -0500

Do the odds of having heart disease increase if your parents have a history of heart disease in their family?

Do your odds of having cancer increase if there is a history of cancer in the family?

The answer to these questions is yes, the risks do increase. In a similar manner, children whose parents have divorced are more likely to divorce than those children who come from intact marriages, where the parents are committed to each other.

A recent article written by Robert J. Hughes, Jr., Professor of Human Development, at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign campus, has compiled the data to support this point. See the article entitled "Are Children of Divorce Doomed to Repeat their Parents' Mistakes?"

The essence of the study is actually quite logical. Children learn from what they see. If they observe parents who are commited to working through conflict, they will be more likely to follow the skills that they have observed and learned for themselves. Unfortunately, the opposite holds true as well. If they observe lack of commitment, they will be more inclined to abandon their own personal relationships as they mature.

Raising strong, healthy children is a responsibility we all share as parents. The responsibility should not be taken lightly.

Payment for private school tuition.........mandatory?

Sat, 25 Dec 2010 12:03:45 -0500

The question of payment for private school tuition comes up frequently during the divorce process. Can this obligation be continued after the divorce, so that the child can continue on with his or her private school enrollment?

The answer to this question depends upon the circumstances existing during the marriage.

In Wilson v. Wilson, 559 So.2d 698, 700 (Fla. 1st DC 1990), it was stated that the court may order a non custodial parent to pay for private education expense if it finds that" the parent has the ability to pay for private school" and the "expenses are in accordance with the family's customary standard of living and are in the child's best interest."

This legal premise was clearly set forth in Luskin v. Luskin, 492 So.2d 783 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). In Luskin, the trial court denied the wife's request to compel the husband to pay for the children's private school tuition and camp expenses. On appeal, the decision was reversed. The appellate court held that the trial court had applied the wrong legal standard to the payment of these expenses. The proper standard, as stated by the court, is a balancing of "needs as fixed by the parties' standard of living, on the one hand, and ability to pay, on the other."

In Luskin, the husband had the ability to pay private school tuition and summer camp costs, and these expenses were in accordance with the family's customary standard of living and were in the children's best interest. Accordingly, the court could order these payments as further support for the children.

However, if payment for tuition for private school, or payment for camp is to be sought, it is very important that the person requesting these payments clearly state so in his or her respective pleadings. Failure to formally plead such a request, even if it is within the customary budget and best interests of the children, will in fact result in a denial of that obligation being paid. In other words, if you don't ask for something, you will not be entitled to reecive it. See Gelman v. Gelman, 24 So.3d 1281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

Child support payments from jail!

Thu, 23 Dec 2010 07:42:08 -0500

Florida has a very strong policy in favor of support for minor children. Even when a parent has no actual income, the courts do not hesitate to impute income to that parent.

Section 61.30(2)(b) governs the imputation of income for purposes of child support: "Income on a monthly basis shall be imputed to an unemployed or underemployed parent when such employment or underemployment is found by the court to be voluntary on that parent's part, absent a finding of fact by the court of physical or mental incapacity or other circumstances over which the parent has no control. In the event of such voluntary unemployment or underemployment, the employment potential and probable earnings level of the parent shall be determined based upon his or her recent work history, occupational qualifications, and prevailing earnings level in the community......."

In the case of McCall v. Martin, 34 So.3d 121 (4DCA 2010), the father was on his way to prison for domestic battery against his wife. The trial court would not establish any child support obligation since the husband would have no income in prison. On appeal, the decision was reversed.

The appellate court stated that a child's best interest is certainly not served by refusing to set an initial amount of support based on imputed income for a parent about to be imprisoned.

The appellate court further stated that income shouild be imputed to the father so that arrearages can accumulate until he is able to earn an income. When his release occurs, the court should establish a payment plan to reduce arrearages according to his earning ability, setting a payment plan.

The Florida Supreme Court has also previously addressed this issue. The court has stated that "an incarcerated parent may not automatically have his or her child support payments obligations modified solely on a reduction of income resulting from incarceration. Dep't of Revenue v. Jackson, 846 So.2d 486, 494 (Fla. 2003).

The highest court in Florida went on to states "If trial courts were permitted to suspend an incarcerated parent's obligation to pay child support, the supported child would never receive the benefit of the support payments to which the child was entitled. Therefore, the child's best interests are certainly best served when courts do not modify an obligor parent's child support payments simply because of the parent's incarceration."

For further understanding of this concept, one should also read the decision of Mascola v. Lusskin, 727 So.2d 328, 333 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). In this particular case, the payor parent attempted to kill the child's mother, and off to prison he went. The court stated that "although his incarceration may relieve him from the use of contempt to coerce payment, that is no cause to reduce the amount of support where the failure to ay results from the payor's voluntary conduct."

Child support is clearly an entitlement for a child, and that entitlement is well protected by our courts.