On July 24, 2026, Governor Maura Healey held a 

DNA Evidence and the 15-year Criminal Statute of Limitations 

Under the new law rape prosecutions may proceed when DNA evidence identifies a suspect after the standard 15-year limitations period has expired. Massachusetts law generally bars prosecutions for the rape of an adult after 15 years. Although legislators have repeatedly sought to extend that limitations period, opponents, including defense attorneys, have argued that doing so could undermine the rights of the accused. To date, there have been limited exceptions to this statute of limitation. One existing exception is the tolling provision in G.L. c. 277, § 63, which excludes from the 15-year calculation any period during which the defendant was not “usually and publicly” a resident within Massachusetts.  

While the new exception to the rape statute of limitations is significant, it does not eliminate the importance of the 15-year window, nor does it address the many other significant evidentiary challenges associated with rape cases. First, if DNA evidence matches to a suspect within the existing 15-year deadline, the new law will not allow prosecutors to rely on the law to file outside of that window. The new provision instead addresses cases in which the identifying DNA match occurs only after the standard limitations period has expired. The law applies prospectively: it will not apply to any case where the 15-year statute of limitations has already passed.  

Further, although DNA evidence may help establish physical contact, it may be less probative when the accused asserts consent, a common defense in rape and other sexual misconduct cases. Consent disputes often turn on corroborating evidence and witness credibility, both of which may be difficult to assess more than 15 years after the alleged incident. Digital evidence, including internet activity, mobile-phone data, and digital communications may help illuminate the parties’ prior relationship and provide context for the consent issue. Its admissibility, however, remains subject to Massachusetts’s rape-shield rule. According to Rule 412 of the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence, evidence offered to prove a complainant’s sexual reputation or other sexual behavior is generally inadmissible. A key exception, however, permits evidence of specific instances of the complainant’s sexual conduct with the person accused of the misconduct. Thus, although the new law may preserve a prosecution when DNA identifies a suspect after 15 years, it does not eliminate the evidentiary challenges inherent in proving an older case, particularly when consent is disputed.  

Adults in Positions of Trust or Authority 

The second new law relates to the ability 16 or 17-year-olds to consent to sexual conduct with adults in positions of authority over them. The age of consent in Massachusetts is 16 years old. That means that anyone younger than 16 cannot legally agree to sexual activity. The new law provides that a child under 18 is also legally incapable of consenting when the accused is a qualifying authority figure, and creates additional criminal liability for prohibited sexual contact by adults serving in such authority roles.   

The new criminal law (G.L. c. 265, § 23A1/2) makes it illegal for a mandated reporter who has “custodial or supervisory authority” to have sexual intercourse with a 16 or 17-year-old, or to commit indecent assault and battery on a minor age 14-17, provided that the adult is more than four years older than the minor. Previously, consensual sex acts between such adults and teenagers they supervised was not criminal. The law applies even if the supervisory authority over the child ended before the sexual conduct occurred. Adults who have sexual intercourse with a 16- or 17-year-old who is, or has previously been, under their authority may face up to 20 years in prison under the law. This law applies to doctors and other medical personnel, private and public school teachers and administrators, probation officers, social workers, foster parents, and clergy, among other mandatory reporters. 

 Conclusion  

These two laws expand the definition of certain sex crimes and prosecutors’ ability to prosecute those crimes. Going forward, the expanded statute of limitations law may increase scrutiny on rape kit testing backlogs that have previously been noted in Massachusetts. Indeed, after Bristol County obtained a federal grant to address its rape kit testing backlog in 2022, the Bristol County District Attorney’s office was able to obtain arrests in multiple rape cases that were more than a decade old. Further, G.L. c. 265, § 23A1/2, by removing consent as a defense for qualifying adults in positions of authority, may open the door to prosecutions of adults in positions of authority who have sex with older teens under their supervision, a situation that has gotten attention recently in high profile cases about sexual abuse by teachers. Together, the reforms remove two different barriers to prosecution: the expiration of the limitations period before DNA identifies a suspect, and the availability of consent as a defense in qualifying position-of-authority cases.  

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* Our blogs are written by the firm’s attorneys, without the use of AI or ghostwriters 

The Best Lawyers in America® 2027 Edition

• Inga S. Bernstein – Criminal Defense: General Practice, Criminal Defense: White-Collar, Employment Law – Individuals, Litigation – Labor and Employment

In the past couple of years, college campuses have dealt with a range of free speech challenges that have become increasingly difficult to navigate amid a polarized political climate and heightened government scrutiny. As campus leaders and a vital bridge between students and the administration, college professors are uniquely positioned to cultivate free speech while helping to foster an inclusive campus environment. The challenge for professors, however, is determining how to exercise this influence while safeguarding their own academic freedom and careers. While the summer is in full swing and college campuses are still several weeks away from welcoming students back, it is never too early for college professors to refresh themselves on the basic boundaries and limitations of their own free speech rights.  

What rights do I have as a professor at a public college or university? 

The First Amendment protects a wide range of speech and applies to many different forms of expression beyond just speaking and writing, including visual expression, such as art, theater, or messages depicted on clothing, and symbolic speech, such as burning a flag. The First Amendment does not protect all speech, though; there are narrow categories of unprotected speech which include obscenity, true threats, and the incitement of imminent lawless action. 

Earlier this month, the Massachusetts State Senate passed a bill (

 I previously discussed a bill approved by the Massachusetts State House that would ban all users under the age of fourteen from social media platforms and mandate all users—including adults—to verify with the platform that they are over the age of fourteen.  

The Senate and House proposals are substantially different: the Senate proposal primarily regulates platforms by restricting the use of addictive features through an optional age verification scheme, and the House proposal regulates users by mandating age verification as a condition to use any platform.   

On June 19, the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) decided to quietly roll back protections for workers, revising its 

What is the MCAD? 

The MCAD is a state agency that is required by law to investigate complaints of discrimination in housing, in the workplace, in places of public accommodation, and in higher education admissions. Employees who experience discrimination are required to file their claims with the MCAD before they can bring those claims in court. The MCAD process moves through two stages: first there is an investigation that results in a decision that there either is probable cause to believe discrimination occurred (a finding for the employee) or there is not probable cause to believe discrimination occurred (a finding for the employer). In fiscal year 2025 the MCAD found for the employer 85% of the time at this stage. When there is a finding of probable cause, the case then moves to conciliation, where the MCAD tries to resolve the case with agreement by the parties. If conciliation is not successful the case moves to a public hearing, where the Commission hears the case and decides whether the employer violated the law and what remedies to impose. 

In a 2021-2022 survey of students across 133 colleges and universities, 

Unfortunately, at the same time in young adults’ lives when mental health struggles can appear and/or increase in severity, those young adults are often in college away from their homes and families. Additionally, as we have previously discussed, while colleges and universities have significant legal relationships with students, their duties with respect to students experiencing mental health issues have historically been limited by Massachusetts courts. 

For example, in 2018, in Dzung Duy Nguyen v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) held that, “[w]here a university has actual knowledge of . . . a student’s stated plans or intentions to commit suicide, the university has a duty to take reasonable measures under the circumstances to protect the student from self-harm.” Yet, this decision does not impose any duty on a college or university that has more general knowledge of a student’s suicidality, such as knowledge of a student’s depression. In Nguyen, that line of reasoning resulted in the SJC holding that Massachusetts Institute of Technology had no duty to protect a student who died by suicide because that student “never communicated by words or actions to any MIT employee that he had stated plans or intentions to commit suicide.” Also relevant to this holding were the facts that Nguyen was a twenty-five-year-old graduate student living off campus rather than “a young student living in a campus dormitory under daily observation,” and that Nguyen repeatedly expressed that he wanted to keep his mental health struggles separate from his academic life. 

Last month, the Massachusetts State House passed a bill (H. 5366) that would have the Commonwealth join fifteen other states in banning cell phones in public schools statewide and 

Proponents of these policies argue that they are a step in the right direction in curbing compulsive cell phone and social media use among children and teens, which may have negative impacts on mental health and cognitive development. 

On the other hand, the age verification component of the bill has faced criticism at both the state and national level, with opponents describing the age verification requirement as draconian and legal advocacy groups arguing that the requirement would violate the First Amendment.

In a decision issued this week, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) held that victims of sexual harassment in academic settings may sue individual harassers directly under G.L. c. 214, § 1C—the state’s sexual harassment statute. The ruling reverses a lower court decision that had dismissed a sexual harassment claim filed by Dr. Kristin Knouse against her former instructor, dissertation committee member, and fellowship director, Dr. David Sabatini. The new ruling clarifies that students and trainees have a statutory right to be free from sexual harassment during their education and may sue individual teachers, faculty, staff, or other students to enforce that right. Naomi Shatz and I filed an 

Background  

The underlying dispute arose between Sabatini, a prominent biologist formerly at the Whitehead Institute and MIT, and Knouse, a former graduate student at MIT and later a Whitehead Fellow. Knouse alleged in internal reports to Whitehead that Sabatini engaged in sexualized comments while he was her instructor and a member of her dissertation committee, that they later had a sexual relationship while he had power over her career, and that Sabatini’s inappropriate conduct continued even after the relationship ended. An internal survey and independent investigation found that engaging in sexual discussions was a requirement for success in Sabatini’s lab and that the lab was dominated by a “culture of fear and retaliation.” When the independent investigation found violations of Whitehead’s sexual harassment policy, Sabatini separated from both Whitehead and MIT. 

To establish a viable claim of employment discrimination or retaliation, an employee must show, among other things, that they suffered an “adverse employment action.” While termination is a quintessential adverse action, less serious actions are also legally sufficient. In a recent decision in 

Background 

In Walsh, the plaintiff, Joanne Walsh, worked as an information technology employee for HNTB Corporation in its Boston office for over 25 years. In 2019, when she was approximately 54 years old, she and another older employee in the same job were placed on nearly identical PIPs. During the course of the PIP, Walsh’s team leader told her that she could “be replaced with younger, cheaper people.” Walsh successfully completed the PIP but then felt that her working conditions deteriorated and she was treated differently than younger employees in the same job. Ten months after completing the PIP, Ms. Walsh and the other older employee who had been placed on the same PIP resigned. Ms. Walsh subsequently sued HNTB under both state and federal law, alleging that it had discriminated against her based on her age by placing her on a PIP and then constructively discharging her. The District Court found for HNTB on the discrimination claims, holding that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Ms. Walsh’s PIP constituted an adverse employment action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) or M.G.L. c. 151B,. The District Court applied the same analysis to Ms. Walsh’s ADEA and 151B claims, noting that “the standards applied for age discrimination claims under federal law and Massachusetts state law are so similar that both claims can be analyzed together.” On March 13, 2026, the First Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling. In doing so, it provided important guidance on the proper adverse-employment-action standard and on when an employer-imposed PIP may satisfy that standard. 

Background 

In Hidalgo v. Watch City Construction Corp., the plaintiff, Andres Hidalgo, who worked as a laborer, sued his employer for violations of the Massachusetts Wage Act and related claims. Mr. Hidalgo alleged that he had only been paid for two out of the six weeks he worked and sought $3,738.67 in lost wages. Due to the Wage Act’s treble damages provision, these unpaid wages would amount to $11,216.01 in damages. Watch City denied Mr. Hidalgo’s allegations and brought counterclaims for, among other things, malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Mr. Hidalgo brought a special motion to dismiss Watch City’s counterclaims under the anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the claims were brought solely to discourage him from continuing with his lawsuit. After a judge denied Mr. Hidalgo’s motion to dismiss, the Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed the decision and ordered the dismissal of Watch City’s counterclaims.