On March 2, 2026, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) heard oral arguments in 

Post-Bruen 2nd Amendment cases in Massachusetts  

The Thomson case represents yet another chapter in this rapidly evolving area of the law. Since the Supreme Court decided Bruen in 2022, Massachusetts courts have grappled with its proper application. As we have noted, in Bruen, the Supreme Court adopted a history- and tradition-focused test for determining the validity of weapons regulations, directing Courts to look at whether the regulation is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of [weapons] regulation.” In United States v. Rahimi, which was decided in 2024, the Supreme Court upheld the regulation of a federal statute prohibiting persons subject to qualifying domestic violence restraining orders from possessing firearms and provided further guidance in how the lower courts should interpret the principles it outlined in Bruen. In its decision in Rahimi the Court noted that valid gun regulations did not need be a “dead ringer” in relation to historical analogues, or have a “historical twin,” to be valid.  

I 

Ongoing Legal Battles 

Though their legal battle is far from complete, Harvard University has found the most success in suing the Trump administration to restore funding. In April 2025, Harvard, and unions representing Harvard faculty and graduate workers, sued the administration for cutting $2.2. billion in funding to the university and its affiliated hospitals that month. The administration argued that these cuts were justified under Title VI because Harvard had supposedly failed to respond appropriately to antisemitism on campus. In September 2025, a federal judge found that these cuts were illegal because, among other issues, the administration did not follow the proper procedure for withdrawing federal grants under Title VI. While this decision restored the flow of federal funding to Harvard for now, the administration has appealed the decision—leaving open the possibility of a reinstatement of the devastating cuts. UCLA won a similar victory last fall when a judge blocked the administration’s proposed funding freeze to that university based on its alleged concerns around antisemitism, transgender athletes, and DEI initiatives. While the administration initially appealed that decision, it dropped the appeal last month. 

Do commercial AI tools always have accurate legal information?

The short answer to this is no. AI tools are known to “hallucinate” or make up plausible-seeming responses that are in fact not based on anything. This is very common in the legal field, where AI tools will invent court cases in response to searches for legal authority on certain points, or will attribute fictional quotes and holdings to real cases. In the last couple of years, many lawyers have faced sanctions for submitting documents to courts that contain hallucinated cases. Just this month a company sued OpenAI, arguing that the company engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when ChatGPT encouraged a woman to try to re-open a settled lawsuit and then generated the pleadings she used in court. Some states are taking steps to prevent AI tools from providing legal advice. A bill in New York would ban chatbots from giving legal or medical advice, and give people a right to sue companies whose chatbots violate the law. As with any information generated by AI tools, it is important to check any AI output about laws or legal cases against actual databases to verify that the information is correct.

If I use AI to develop a summary of my case for an attorney, is that summary privileged?

When it comes to protecting documents from disclosure to the opposing side in a legal case, there are two important protections to understand: the attorney-client privilege and the work product protection. Many people know about the attorney-client privilege, which protects private communications between an attorney and someone seeking legal advice (even if they are not officially a client yet). This privilege generally only applies to confidential communications between the attorney and client; in most cases if a third party joins the conversation the privilege is waived. The work product protection protects documents that are prepared in anticipation of litigation. Just like the attorney-client privilege, this protection can be waived if the materials are showed to a third party in a way that makes it likely the materials could end up in the hands of the legal adversary.

What does this mean for people using AI? On February 10 two federal judges came to opposite conclusions about whether a litigant’s AI prompts and responses had to be disclosed to the other side in litigation. In New York, a judge in the Southern District addressed whether a defendants’ communications with AI, seized by the government pursuant to a search warrant, could be protected from inspection (U.S. v. Heppner). The judge held that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work-product protection applied to those materials. In his written opinion memorializing the decision, the judge reasoned (1) there no attorney-client privilege because the defendant’s communications with Claude were not with an attorney, (2) there was no expectation of confidentiality in the communications with Claude because the terms of use make clear that Claude reserves the right to disclose data to third parties and to use people’s inputs for training; and (3) because the lawyer did not direct the defendant to use Claude, he wasn’t using it for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. The judge read the scope of the work product protection narrowly and found it did not apply because the AI documents were not prepared at the behest of counsel and did not reflect the lawyer’s case strategy.

That same day in a civil case in the Eastern District of Michigan, a judge granted a self-represented plaintiff’s motion to protect information about her use of AI tools in connection with the litigation. The judge in that case (Warner v. Gilbarco, Inc.) found that the work product doctrine protected the plaintiff’s AI searches made in conjunction with her litigation. The judge held that the work product doctrine protects parties’ ability to use AI tools just as they use more traditional tools to prepare for litigation. The judge also noted that AI programs are “tools, not persons,” and the protection over work product is only waived when the work product is disclosed in a way that is likely to get it into the hands of a litigant’s adversary. He found that entering work product into a LLM was not likely to result in disclosure of the work product to an adversary.

Two district court decisions cannot tell us much about how this law will develop, nor whether it will develop uniformly across the country. In Massachusetts, for example, the work product protection does not depend on documents being created “at the behest” of counsel, as the New York court held was necessary for the protection to attach. Instead, where litigants create documents “because of” existing or anticipated litigation those documents are protected by the work product doctrine. Factors such as whether the AI tools save, train on, and might disclose inputs may be relevant to determinations about how these protections apply, as do the specific factual circumstances surrounding why and how a litigant used AI tools.

What are the takeaways from these cases?

Technology develops more quickly than the law, and courts are just starting to decide how to handle generative AI in litigation. The most important lesson from this rapidly developing landscape is that you should always speak to a lawyer before putting information about your case into an AI tool, and review legal information provided by AI tools through a critical lens.

If you are looking to speak to a lawyer about your criminal, employment, or academic legal issues please contact us.

* Our blogs are written by the firm’s attorneys, without the use of AI or ghostwriters 

Earlier this week, the Supreme Judicial Court issued a decision on the rights of public employee whistleblowers. The decision clarified what activity is protected under the Massachusetts Whistleblower Act, G. L. c. 149, § 185 (“MWA”), and addressed whether a public employee who is partially responsible for wrongful conduct, but reports the wrongful conduct, can still seek protection under the MWA.

Background 

In Galvin v. Roxbury Community College, the plaintiff, Thomas Galvin, was the college’s primary campus security authority and was responsible for the school’s compliance with the Clery Act, a federal law that requires colleges and universities that receive federal financial aid to disclose crime statistics to the U.S. Department of Education annually. In August 2010, the college’s HR director received two complaints from a student alleging that she had been sexually assaulted on campus by two college professors in previous years. When Galvin asked whether there were any reported crimes that needed to be disclosed to comply with the Clery Act, the HR director failed to disclose these complaints. In November 2010, after learning of the complaints and asking his supervisor about whether they should be disclosed, he was again told that there was nothing to disclose. The reporting responsibility ultimately rested with Galvin, who decided not to disclose the allegations in the college’s 2010 Clery Act report. On the same day, Galvin’s supervisor arranged for the student who made the allegations to be provided with a scholarship for the remaining balance of her semester bill.  

In early 2011, Galvin met with Department of Education employees to seek guidance on reporting the two assault allegations and compliance with the Clery Act; the employees told him that they were unsure about his situation and that they would get back to him. In July 2011, Galvin met with staff from the State Auditor’s office and told them about the assault allegations, the college’s failure to report the allegations, and the scholarship given to the complaining student. The State Auditor’s staff notified the college’s chair of the board of trustees about Galvin’s disclosures, which began a formal investigation. That investigation determined that the college’s failure to report the allegations violated the Clery Act.  Two months after the investigation concluded, Galvin received a negative performance evaluation largely due to his role in failing to ensure Clery Act compliance. One month later, he was terminated. 

Lower Court  

Galvin sued the college for wrongful termination in violation of the MWA. To make out a claim under the MWA, public employees are required to show that (1) they engaged in protected activity, (2) an adverse action was taken against them by their employer because of the protected activity, and (3) the adverse action caused the employee damages. Here, the motion judge made two primary determinations: Galvin was a whistleblower as a matter of law because he reasonably believed the college’s failure to report the student’s allegations violated the Clery Act, and the question of whether Galvin was terminated because of his whistleblowing activity, rather than because of his own performance deficiencies, was a question for the jury to decide. The jury agreed with Galvin, concluding that he was indeed terminated because of his whistleblowing activity, and awarded him $980,000 in damages. The college appealed the judge’s decision granting summary judgment on the question of whether Galvin engaged in protected activity, arguing that that question should have been decided by a jury. 

SJC Decision 

In its opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the motion judge’s conclusions and emphasized three points.  

First, as to the MWA’s protected activity requirement, “where the activity objected to is undisputably illegal, nothing further is required to establish that the employee engaged in protected activity for maintaining a claim under [the MWA].” Here, the college’s failure to report the two sexual assault allegations were “undisputably illegal” because the college itself recognized that the allegations should have been reported to the Department of Education and the failure to report occurred repeatedly, as the student made multiple allegations over the course of several years. The court noted that where the legality of the activity was disputed, or an employee’s belief in the activity’s legality erroneous, the question of whether the employee engaged in protected activity is a “more complex” question. 

Second, a public employee whistleblower does not lose MWA protection even if they are involved in the wrongful activity. Stripping whistleblower protections from employees involved in the wrongdoing would discourage the revelation of that wrongdoing, which is contrary to the statute’s purpose. And, as the Court pointed out, employee involvement in the wrongdoing is not uncommon; it is often how employees learn about wrongful activity in the first place. The employee’s own misconduct, however, would factor into the question of whether they were terminated because of their whistleblowing activity or for their role in the misconduct. 

Third, for an employee to establish that they engaged in protected activity, they must show that their objecting activity was based on a reasonable belief that the employer’s actions are unlawful. This reasonable belief requirement is automatically satisfied where the activity in question is undisputedly illegal. Contrary to the college’s position, an employee must only show that their belief that the activity was illegal is in “good faith” when that belief is erroneous. When the objection is “undisputably unlawful,” as it was here, the employee does not have to show good faith. 

The Court’s decision is a positive step in bolstering whistleblower protections and protecting the rights of public employees to report illegal or unsafe actions by their employer without fear of reprisal.  

If you believe that you have been retaliated against for engaging in whistleblower activity, or if you have another workplace legal concern, contact our employment attorneys at (617) 742-6020. 

* Our blogs are written by the firm’s attorneys, without the use of AI or ghostwriters 

Since taking office, the Trump administration has overhauled enforcement of federal anti-discrimination laws on college campuses, particularly the laws that prohibit discrimination on the bases of race and sex. Now, less than one year later, six leading universities—the University of Pennsylvania, Columbia University, Brown University, the University of Virginia, Cornell University, and Northwestern University—have signed deals with the Trump administration. The focus of these deals on specific forms of supposed discrimination occurring on campus—namely antisemitism, “DEI” initiatives, and gender inclusivity in university facilities and athletic programs—illustrate the Trump administration’s enforcement priorities at higher education institutions.  

Legal Background  

Title VI and Title IX prohibit discrimination in programs that receive federal funding. These laws apply to almost all colleges and universities, both public and private. Both laws are among the shortest on the books.   

Title VI states, “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  

Title IX states, “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” For more background on the changes the Trump administration has made to enforcement of Title IX, click here.  

Title VI and Title IX can be enforced in two ways: through the courts and through administrative agencies. Individuals have a right to bring lawsuits in court to enforce their rights, where a judge and jury will interpret what the laws mean and decide whether they were violated. In addition, federal agencies have enforcement powers to investigate and address violations of Title VI and Title IX. That agency enforcement power rests with the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Justice. People whose right to be free from discrimination in education have been violated can file complaints with those agencies, which can then investigate the educational institutions and impose corrective action, such as the withholding of federal funds.   

What exactly are these deals between the administration and higher education institutions?  

The purpose of the deals is to settle federal investigations against these universities for alleged violations of Title VI and Title IX. The Trump administration has been using such investigations to justify freezing the flow of federal funding—a devastating blow to university balance sheets. As Brown President Christina H. Paxson stated after signing a deal, “A federal funding freeze that began in April posed enormous challenges for Brown’s research mission and financial sustainability, and if left unaddressed, would have undermined our ability to conduct life-saving research and to offer our students a world-class education.”  

How do these deals impact students?  

Though each of the six deals have terms unique to each university, there are four themes that demonstrate how life and work on campus may shift because of these deals:   

A focus on antisemitism on campus:  

Four of the five public deals (Penn’s is not public) contain provisions related to enhancing enforcement against antisemitism on campus. Brown, Cornell, and Northwestern each agreed to conduct a survey “to evaluate the campus climate” with a focus on Jewish students. These universities will ask students whether they feel safe reporting antisemitism on campus and whether they feel their school has responded appropriately to allegations of antisemitic conduct. Northwestern and Brown are subject to further requirements under their deals, such as maintaining advisory councils for Jewish life, providing enhanced security for Jewish student events, and engaging in other community-oriented outreach to Jewish stakeholders.  
  
Columbia, a university where pro-Palestinian student protests in spring 2024 received national attention and the ire of President Trump, is now subject to a host of additional conditions regarding antisemitism. These conditions include a “thorough review” of all academic programs relating to the Middle East to ensure that educational offerings are “comprehensive and balanced,” a slate of new faculty members with positions in the Institute for Israel and Jewish Studies, and a new administrator dedicated to serving as a liaison to Jewish students. 

A campaign to police trans women on campus:  

All five of the public deals contain provisions restricting trans women from accessing campus resources and facilities according to their gender identity. Each of the public deals require the schools to segregate women’s sports teams, locker rooms, and showering facilities according to biological sex, not gender identity, effectively banning trans women from those programs and facilities. Four schools—Brown, Virginia, Cornell, and Northwestern—take this ban a step further in agreeing to provisions that either explicitly, or in effect, bar trans women from accessing all bathroom facilities designated for women. Penn’s deal, though not public, may contain the strongest language against the presence of trans women on campus, with a particular focus on trans student athletes. Shortly after inking the deal, the university released a statement, which states that the university will comply with two executive orders titled, “Defending Women From Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government” and “Keeping Men Out of Women’s Sports.” Furthermore, the university sent “personalized” apology letters to its female swimmers aggrieved by Lia Thomas’—a trans woman—participation on the women’s swim team. The university also stripped Thomas of all the records and honors she earned as a member of the women’s swim team.   

A reversal of many pro-diversity initiatives in admissions and hiring:  

Columbia, Brown, and Northwestern each agreed to “maintain merit-based admissions policies.” In doing so, the universities removed any sections from their applications that would be perceived by the Trump administration as proxies to preference applicants based on race or national origin, such as diversity statements.  
  
Three schools, Virginia, Cornell, and Northwestern, adopted a Department of Justice guidance titled, “Guidance for Recipients of Federal Funding Regarding Unlawful Discrimination,” which takes aim at pro-diversity initiatives in the workplace context. Specifically, the guidance describes various affirmative action programs as illegal, including race-based trainings, race-dedicated lounges and spaces, sex-based selection for contracts, and race and sex-based quotas for program participation.   

An attack on student expression:  

Two agreements—Columbia and Northwestern—contain language curtailing campus protests. Columbia’s agreement requires the university to prohibit protest activities in academic buildings, prohibit the use of masks for concealing one’s identity, and require all individuals at protests to present university identification upon request. Northwestern’s agreement requires the school to renege on the 2024 “Deering Meadow Agreement,” in which the university agreed, among other items, to establish formal lines of communication between the student body and the administration regarding the university’s investment holdings and to fund a minimum number of Palestinian faculty and undergraduate students on campus.   

As we have previously noted, the administration’s interpretation of the law is not always consistent with how courts have interpreted the law. Students whose schools have entered into agreements with the federal government retain their legal rights under state and federal law, and may be able to challenge new university policies that violate those rights. 

If you or someone you know is facing discrimination or harassment at school or is involved in a Title IX or discrimination proceeding, fill out our online intake form or call us at (617) 742-6020 to be connected with one of our lawyers.  

* Our blogs are written by the firm’s attorneys, without the use of AI or ghostwriters 

Massachusetts Pay Transparency Law Goes Into Effect

In recent years, in an attempt to address concerns related to pay disparities across race, gender and other group classifications, several states have adopted various forms of pay transparency legislation. On a macro level, these laws represent an attempt to remedy pay gaps that have historically existed between workers of different demographic groups. Under a pay transparency regime, workers are provided easier access to information about the pay range of their job, which they are then able to utilize to their advantage when negotiating wages with their employers. On October 29, 2025, the pay transparency provision of “An Act Relative to Salary Range Transparency” went into effect in Massachusetts, and Massachusetts joined the growing list of states that have adopted legislation aimed at increasing pay transparency in the workforce.  

An Act Relative to Salary Range Transparency 

Governor Maura Healey signed “An Act Relative to Salary Range Transparency” into law on July 31, 2024. The act is an amendment to the Massachusetts Equal Pay Act (MEPA), which went into effect on July 1, 2018. MEPA provides that employers may not pay workers a wage less than what they pay employees of a different gender for “comparable work,” or work that requires substantially similar skill, effort, and responsibility, and is performed under similar working conditions. The pay transparency amendment builds on some of the principles that were established with the adoption of MEPA and represents an attempt to increase workers’ bargaining power by reducing barriers to the access of wage information. 

The pay transparency provision covers employers with 25 or more Massachusetts employees (including remote employees whose primary place of work is Massachusetts), and requires covered employers to disclose a pay range in any advertisement or job posting intended to recruit applicants for a particular and specific employment position. The act defines pay range as “the annual salary range or hourly wage range that the covered employer reasonably and in good faith expects to pay for such a position at the time.” Importantly, however, the pay transparency act covers more than just employers’ job postings. Under the act, covered employers must also disclose a “good faith” pay range to: (1) any applicant for a position, upon request; (2) current employees who are offered a promotion or transfer; and (3) current employees who request the pay range for their own position. Employees or applicants who exercise their rights under the act, by making a pay transparency inquiry or participating in a proceeding or initiating a complaint related to an alleged violation of the act, are further protected against any retaliation from employers for doing so.  

The Attorney General’s Fair Labor Division is charged with enforcing the Wage Transparency Act. Employees who believe their rights under the Act have been violated can file a complaint with that office; they do not have a right to sue their employers for relief in court. The Attorney General’s office may enforce the act by obtaining injunctive or declaratory relief, and also may impose fines on employers who violate the act. There is a grace period: for the next two years employers can cure violations of the law within two business days of receiving notice of a violation from the Attorney General’s Office. 

Relation to MEPA and other anti-discrimination laws 

Although individual employees and job applicants may not enforce their rights under the pay transparency provision by filing a lawsuit, the increased access to wage information that employees benefit from under the act may allow them to better vindicate their rights under MEPA, which, as described above, allows employees who believe they are being paid unfairly for “comparable work” as compared to employees of another gender to file suit. Under MEPA employers do not need to intentionally discriminate to incur liability. Thus, an employee considering bringing a MEPA action may be able to better evaluate their potential MEPA claim by taking advantage of the new pay transparency provision to obtain information about the pay range for their job. Similarly, employees evaluating whether they are being discriminated against in pay based on other protected characteristics can gain valuable information about their pay relative to their co-workers’. 

Overall, the pay transparency law is an important step in shoring up MEPA, and both current and prospective employees should generally see a boost in their bargaining power. Notably, however, the law does not require the disclosure of non-salary related benefits, which sometimes represent a significant portion of employee compensation. Furthermore, MEPA, by focusing only on pay discrepancies between genders for similar jobs, does little to address occupational segregation in the workforce, where different classes may work in different jobs and workplaces altogether. Regardless, the pay transparency provision clearly strengthens MEPA and other workplace anti-discrimination laws, and will force employers into having more of an open dialogue with employees regarding their compensation decisions.  

If you are experiencing violations of your rights at work, please contact our employment lawyers at (617)-742-6020.

* Our blogs are written by the firm’s attorneys, without the use of AI or ghostwriters 

During this time, the Massachusetts legislature led the nation by outlawing some of the worst ways in which factory owners were taking advantage of employees. For example, the state limited the number of hours children could work each day in 1842, passed the first factory safety and health law in the United States in 1877, and was the first state to adopt a minimum wage law in 1912.

In 1879, the Massachusetts legislature revolutionized labor yet again when it passed the Massachusetts Wage Act. This Act, which the Supreme Judicial Court has said was “intended and designed to protect wage earners from the long-term detention of wages by unscrupulous employers,” states that, on the day an employee is discharged from their employment, their employer must pay them the full wages or salary they are owed. Any employer that fails to make these payments on time is required to pay treble (triple) damages.

This law has stood for almost 150 years, protecting employees and ensuring they are paid the money they are owed in a timely manner. Yet, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court limited the Wage Act’s reach on October 22, 2025, when it decided Nunez v. Syncsort Incorporated.

The plaintiff, Carlos Nunez, worked as a senior director of finance at Syncsort. A few months after he was hired, Nunez and Syncsort entered into a retention bonus agreement, which stated that Nunez would be eligible to earn a retention bonus of $15,000 in two equal tranches on November 18, 2020, and February 18, 2021. The agreement also specified that, “[i]n order to earn each [b]onus [t]ranche, [Nunez] must remain employed by [Syncsort], or any of [its] affiliated entities, with no reduction in [his] regular work schedule . . ., and in good performance standing, through and including the applicable [r]etention [d]ate.”

Nunez remained employed by Syncsort through November 18, 2020, and Syncsort paid him his first bonus on November 30, 2020. In January 2021, however, Nunez was notified that his employment would end on February 18, 2021. He remained employed through that date, but Syncsort paid the second bonus payment eight days later. Nunez then sued Syncsort, asserting (among other things) that Syncsort violated the Wage Act by not timely paying him the second tranche of his retention bonus on his last day. By the time the case reached summary judgment, that was Nunez’s only claim remaining.

This case came down to the question of what a “wage” is under the Wage Act. Despite its title, focus, and purpose, the Wage Act does not provide a comprehensive definition of the term “wages.” The statute discusses “wages” as something to be paid weekly or biweekly, which the Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted to mean payment for labor or services. The Act also specifically states that “wages” include any holiday or vacation payments due under an oral or written agreement, and any commissions that became payable to the employee before their discharge. Conversely, however, the Supreme Judicial Court has held that unused sick time, discretionary stock option plans, profit distributions under stock agreements, deferred compensation plans, and severance pay are not “wages” for the purposes of the Wage Act.

In this case, the Supreme Judicial Court held that Nunez’s retention bonus was a type of “contingent compensation” that is not a “wage” under the Wage Act. Specifically, the Court stated that, where a contingency imposes “some requirement beyond the services or labor an employee provides in exchange for his or her compensation,” that compensation is not a “wage” for the purposes of the Act. Although Nunez did not have to do anything other than continue to perform his job duties in order to earn his retention bonus, the Court held that, because the retention bonus was given in exchange for Nunez working for the fixed term, it was not a wage.

In holding that retention bonuses do not constitute “wages” within the scope of the Wage Act, the Supreme Judicial Court has allowed employers to withhold one type of payment from discharged employees without the risk of treble damages. More importantly, however, the justices have narrowed the definition of “wages,” limiting it to just the compensation paid in exchange for labor performed, including commissions. It appears that now, if there is any other requirement put on a monetary benefit offered to an employee, that monetary benefit will not be considered a “wage,” and the Wage Act therefore does not require that it be paid out on the last day of work.

If your employer is withholding your wages, or you have another workplace legal concern, contact our employment attorneys at (617) 742-6020.

* Our blogs are written by the firm’s attorneys, without the use of AI or ghostwriters 

As we have

Passage of the bipartisan legislation has been welcomed as a step toward curbing online harassment and exploitation, a problem that is only becoming more widespread as AI makes it easier to access sexual images and create fake ones. Yet as with other laws aimed at regulating online content, the new statute is open to potential challenges, largely on free speech grounds.  

Criminal offense and penalties  

As book bans continue to cause controversy nationwide, Massachusetts lawmakers are considering a bill that would prohibit ideologically driven book bans and protect public school employees from retaliation based on good faith decisions to include or exclude materials from their libraries. 

Massachusetts is no exception from the nationwide movement toward ideologically driven book bans. In 2024, the Commonwealth experienced twenty attempts to ban books from school and public libraries, eighth most in the country. This number represented a decline from 2023, when the Commonwealth encountered thirty-seven attempts to ban books, fourth most in the country.  

Nationwide, interest groups and government entities have spearheaded campaigns to ban books. Of such campaigns, seventy-two percent are led by interest groups and government entities. In comparison, only sixteen percent of these campaigns are led by parents.  

Massachusetts courts have recognized self-defense as a defense to homicide as far back as the trial following the Boston Massacre in 1770, where John Adams successfully defended all but one of a group of British soldiers who had fired into a crowd of protesters that had thrown objects at them. In all that time, however, Massachusetts courts had never definitively answered the question of whether the defense applies where in the process of defending oneself, a defendant kills an innocent bystander. 

That changed on Tuesday, when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court addressed the question in its decision in Commonwealth v. Santana-Rodriguez. The defendant in the case, Kenneth Jose Santana-Rodriguez, was at a salon with his girlfriend when her former boyfriend confronted him. Revealing a gun in his waistband, the ex-boyfriend stated, “You know what’s about to happen.” Believing “it was him or [the ex-boyfriend],” the defendant drew a gun and fired at the ex-boyfriend, but instead hit Trung Tran, a salon employee, who was killed.  

In its opinion, the Court concluded that Santana-Rodriguez and similarly situated defendants acting in lawful self-defense cannot be guilty of first- or second-degree murder, but can still be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter if the prosecution proves that a defendant’s exercise of self-defense “was wanton or reckless so as to create a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm would result to an unintended victim.” In coming to this conclusion, the Court applied the concept of transferred intent to the self-defense context. Transferred intent is a theory of criminal liability that allows a defendant who attempts to kill one person, but by mistake or accident kills another, to still be criminally liable for the killing because their “felonious intent is transferred from the intended victim to the unintended victim.” In the self-defense context, when a defendant uses force to defend against an aggressor, but by mistake or accident harms someone other than the aggressor, the justifiability of the defendant’s use of force in self-defense carries over, or “transfers.” As stated in the opinion, the “intent follows the bullet.”