Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Decided: March 17, 2026 Outcome: Disbarment

Background

Leonard Slodov, a homeowner and former treasurer of Eagle Ridge Subdivision homeowners association, sued the law firm Ott & Associates for legal malpractice. Slodov had served on the association’s board for 12 years until allegedly being improperly removed in 2021. After his removal, Ott & Associates (representing the association) filed a lien and foreclosure action against Slodov for unpaid dues. Slodov then filed this malpractice suit both individually and purportedly on behalf of the association.

The opinion sets out the key facts in these two paragraphs:

In 2016, Campbell executed a consent to change attorneys form and filed it in the Supreme Court, Kings County. Campbell then moved in the Supreme Court to restore the action to the active calendar, for summary judgment on the issue of liability, and for leave to file a note of issue. In an order dated November 22, 2017, the motion was denied without prejudice to refile in the Civil Court, Kings County. Campbell then moved in the Civil Court to restore the action to the active calendar and for summary judgment on the issue of liability. In an order dated December 10, 2019, the Civil Court denied the motion (hereinafter the Civil Court order).

In January 2020, Campbell commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice. The defendants moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the cause of action alleging legal malpractice as time-barred. In an order dated May 25, 2023, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted that branch of the motion. Campbell appeals.

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Ed Clinton, Jr.

To Mr. Vose’s first point, jurors could not merely rely on their common knowledge to determine whether Defendants committed malpractice. For example, Mr. Vose does not allege that Defendants failed to file a suit within the appropriate statute of limitations period or failed to inform him of a settlement offer—situations where negligence would be “clear and palpable.” Cronan, 972 A.2d at 173 (citations omitted). Rather, Mr. Vose’s malpractice allegations concern assertions that Defendants failed to: (1) impeach a witness; (2) call various witnesses; (3) present expert medical testimony; (4) file certain motions; (5) demonstrate adequate knowledge of the applicable law; (6) introduce evidence of impropriety by the police and others; (7) maintain his innocence; and (8) properly object to certain evidence. See ECF No. 94 at 4-34. These allegations implicate Defendants’ application of their legal expertise when representing Mr. Vose in his criminal matters. Accordingly, expert evidence is required to establish the standard of care applicable to an attorney in Attorney Goldberg’s position. See Focus Inv. Assocs., Inc., 992 F.2d at 1240 (affirming district court’s determination that expert testimony was required to establish the standard of care because the plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim implicated issues of the defendant-attorney’s application of legal expertise)….

Without expert testimony, Mr. Vose is unable make a showing sufficient to establish the appropriate standard of care—an essential element of his legal malpractice claims. Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 89, and DENIES Mr. Vose’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 75. The Court also DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 79, as moot.

Collateral Estoppel bars a party from relitigating an issue that the party lost in a prior proceeding. New York defines it as: “‘The doctrine of collateral estoppel, a narrower species of res judicata, precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity, whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same” (Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494, 500 [emphasis omitted]; see Matter of Maione v. Zucker, 210 AD3d 776, 777). “`This doctrine applies only if the issue in the second action is identical to an issue which was raised, necessarily decided and material in the first action, and the . . . party to be bound had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier action'” (Matter of Maione v. Zucker, 210 AD3d at 777 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted], quoting City of New York v. Welsbach Elec. Corp., 9 NY3d 124, 128).'”

The court rejected the collateral estoppel defense on the ground that the law firm did not prove that the issues determine in the two cases were identical: “Here, the defendants asserted that in light of the denial of an application by the plaintiff for accidental disability retirement benefits and the dismissal of the plaintiff’s proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review the denial of that application, the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from claiming that she suffered a work-related injury. Therefore, the defendants argued that the plaintiff could not establish that she would have prevailed in the FELA action but for the defendants’ alleged negligent failure to prosecute that action. Contrary to the defendants’ contention, however, the defendants failed to demonstrate an identity of issues between the FELA action and the determination of either the plaintiff’s application for accidental disability retirement benefits or the CPLR article 78 proceeding (see Weslowski v. Zugibe, 167 AD3d 972, 975). Whereas the FELA action involved the issue of whether the MTA’s alleged negligence played any part in producing the injuries for which the plaintiff sought damages (see Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 US 500, 506; Grasso v. Long Is. R.R., 306 AD2d 378, 379), that issue was not litigated and necessarily decided against the plaintiff either in the context of her application for accidental disability retirement benefits or in the CPLR article 78 proceeding (see Kenny v. New York City Tr. Auth., 275 AD2d 639, 640). Thus, the defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging legal malpractice based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The defendants also failed to establish, prima facie, that the MTA neither created nor had actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous conditions at issue in the FELA action (see Lauzon v. Stop & Shop Supermarket, 188 AD3d 856, 857; Ariza v. Number One Star Mgt. Corp., 170 AD3d 639, 639). Thus, the defendants failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that the plaintiff would not have prevailed in the FELA action but for their alleged failure to prosecute that action (see Detoni v. McMinkens, 147 AD3d 1018, 1020).

Don’t Sue The Other Party’s Lawyer

Unfortunately, one of the most common ways for a lawyer to be sued is by an opposing party. As a lawyer, you owe a duty to your client. You do not owe a duty to the opposing party. (There are duties to the Court and duties to comply with professional rules too, but those are not at involved here.) In my career I have been sued twice by opposing parties. Both cases were dismissed.

Cole v. Yanoff, 2025 IL App (1^st) 241017-U is a new version of this old story. Yanoff represented a landlord who sued and sought to evict Cole. In the eviction case (the first case) Cole then sued Yanoff for breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress. After he lost the eviction case, Cole filed another case (the second case) against Yanoff. The Circuit Court dismissed the second case on the grounds of the Absolute Litigation privilege and Cole appealed. The absolute litigation privilege prohibits a litigant from suing the other party’s lawyer if the cause of action arises out of the legal work the lawyer did.

The opinion sets forth the facts as follows:

¶ 6 In July 2018, Matthew confessed to Rodney that he had misrepresented to investors how he managed their money. Matthew admitted that he had “`lost'” $21 million that he had gathered from investors. Matthew asked for Rodney’s help with his plan to recover the money, which involved selling the “algorithmic application” used by investors. Matthew also told Rodney that he was the subject of a criminal grand jury investigation led by the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of California. Rodney agreed to help Matthew and to act as legal liaison to Matthew’s criminal defense counsel. By the end of August 2018, Rodney concluded that the misappropriated monies would not be recovered through the sale of the algorithmic application.

Crab eater seal

In Taylor v. Attorneys At Law, CAAP-22-000396 (unpublished), Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals, the court affirmed a grant of summary judgment to the defendant attorneys in a legal malpractice claim. Plaintiff retained them to prosecuted a wrongful death action arising out of the death of Taylor’s father. Defendants obtained a settlement of that case. Taylor sued and alleged legal malpractice. The Defendants moved for summary judgment. Because the defendants met their initial burden of production in their motion, summary judgment was granted. The quoted portion of the opinion demonstrates solid legal work by the Defendant attorneys and supports the decision to grant them summary judgment:

We conclude that the Defendants satisfied their initial burden on summary judgment through the declaration of Francis R. Alcain (Alcain), and the attached exhibits. Alcain, an attorney with Crudele & De Lima, represented that, pursuant to Taylor’s own instructions, Crudele & De Lima distributed the entirety of Taylor’s portion of the settlement award to Taylor’s daughter and sister in four disbursements,^[2]