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<channel>
	<title>Global Trade &amp; Sanctions Law</title>
	<atom:link href="https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/</link>
	<description>Breaking News and Insights Published by Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 Apr 2026 18:26:31 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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	<item>
		<title>EU Adopts 20th Sanctions Package Targeting Russia and Belarus</title>
		<link>https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/eu-20th-sanctions-package-russia-belarus/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Steven Farmer, Mark Booth, Iris Karaman and Samson Verebes]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 24 Apr 2026 18:26:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Belarus Sanctions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU Sanctions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia Sanctions]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/?p=2491</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[On April 23, 2026, the EU adopted its 20th sanctions package targeting Russia and Belarus in connection with the Russia-Ukraine conflict.  The latest package significantly expands the EU’s restrictive measures across the energy, finance and crypto, trade, services and maritime and transport sectors, with a core focus on anti-circumvention and energy measures. A summary of [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On April 23, 2026, the EU adopted its 20<sup>th</sup> sanctions package targeting Russia and Belarus in connection with the Russia-Ukraine conflict.</p>
<p><strong> </strong>The latest package significantly expands the EU’s restrictive measures across the energy, finance and crypto, trade, services and maritime and transport sectors, with a core focus on anti-circumvention and energy measures. A summary of the key updates follows.</p>
<p></p><p class="read_more_link"><a href="https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/eu-20th-sanctions-package-russia-belarus/">Continue reading →</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">2491</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Trump Administration Revamps Section 232 Metal Duties, Bringing Clarity and New Complexity to Tariffs on Derivative Products</title>
		<link>https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/trump-administration-section-232-metal-duties/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stephan E. Becker, Sahar J. Hafeez and Julian M. Beach]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 15:49:58 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Section 232]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump Administration]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/?p=2488</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In an April 2, 2026 Proclamation, the Trump administration made significant changes to the implementation of the existing tariffs on steel, copper, and aluminum products and derivative articles under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act (“Section 232”). Since June 2025, Section 232 duties on mixed metal and non-metal products have been calculated based on [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In an April 2, 2026 <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/04/strengthening-actions-taken-to-adjust-imports-of-aluminum-steel-and-copper-into-the-united-states/">Proclamation</a>, the Trump administration made significant changes to the implementation of the existing tariffs on steel, copper, and aluminum products and derivative articles under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act (“Section 232”). Since <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/06/09/2025-10524/adjusting-imports-of-aluminum-and-steel-into-the-united-states">June 2025</a>, Section 232 duties on mixed metal and non-metal products have been calculated based on the <strong>value</strong> of the steel, aluminum or copper content within the article. This instruction to separate out metal versus non-metal content resulted in considerable confusion regarding the methodology to determine the <a href="https://www.cbp.gov/trade/programs-administration/entry-summary/232-tariffs-aluminum-and-steel-faqs.">price paid by the importer</a> for steel or aluminum consistent with the principles of 19 U.S.C. 1401a.</p>
<p></p><p class="read_more_link"><a href="https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/trump-administration-section-232-metal-duties/">Continue reading →</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">2488</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>OFAC Issues Broad Authorizations for Dealings with PdVSA</title>
		<link>https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/ofac-authorizations-pdvsa/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christopher R. Wall, Stephan E. Becker, Aaron R. Hutman, Matthew R. Rabinowitz, Samantha Franks, Erin Kwiatkowski and Daniel Steinfeld]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 16:25:24 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[OFAC Sanctions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Venezuela]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/?p=2486</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[On March 18, 2026, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Venezuela General License 52 (GL 52). The license broadly authorizes established U.S. entities to engage in transactions with Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA)—including oil trading, new investment and the formation of joint ventures—while maintaining substantial restrictions on counterparties, payment [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On March 18, 2026, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Venezuela <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/935356/download?inline">General License 52</a> (GL 52). The license broadly authorizes established U.S. entities to engage in transactions with Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA)—including oil trading, new investment and the formation of joint ventures—while maintaining substantial restrictions on counterparties, payment structures, and debt- or equity-related transactions. OFAC simultaneously issued FAQ 1245 and FAQ 1246, which clarify the scope of authorized activities, confirm key exclusions, and address the license’s implications for high-profile enforcement matters.</p>
<p></p><p class="read_more_link"><a href="https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/ofac-authorizations-pdvsa/">Continue reading →</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">2486</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>OFSI Publishes Consultation Response and Updated Enforcement Guidance: Key Changes for UK Sanctions Enforcement</title>
		<link>https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/ofsi-consultation-response-updated-enforcement-guidance-key-changes-uk-sanctions/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Steven Farmer, Scott Morton, Mark Booth, Iris Karaman and Samson Verebes]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Mar 2026 19:01:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Sanctions (General)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United Kingdom (UK)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI)]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/?p=2482</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[On January 29, 2026, HM Treasury’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) published its response to the consultation on “Improving civil enforcement processes for financial sanctions” (“Consultation Response”), confirming that OFSI intends to proceed with all proposals consulted on in July 2025, subject to limited legislative dependencies. The majority of the changes have now been [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On January 29, 2026, HM Treasury’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) published its <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/697b5944f8f4a746d9572f12/Consultation_Response.pdf">response</a> to the consultation on “Improving civil enforcement processes for financial sanctions” (“<strong>Consultation Response</strong>”), confirming that OFSI intends to proceed with all proposals <a href="/assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/687a2e443f4bde279ef45271/OFSI_s_enforcement_processes.pdf">consulted on</a> in July 2025, subject to limited legislative dependencies. The majority of the changes have now been operationalized through <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-enforcement-and-monetary-penalties-guidance/financial-sanctions-enforcement-and-monetary-penalties-guidance">updated guidance</a> published on February 9, 2026.</p>
<p></p><p class="read_more_link"><a href="https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/ofsi-consultation-response-updated-enforcement-guidance-key-changes-uk-sanctions/">Continue reading →</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">2482</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>An Integrated Approach to International Investment Protection</title>
		<link>https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/integrated-international-investment-protection/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Robert A. James and Alicia M. McKnight]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Mar 2026 16:17:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Energy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Investment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Venezuela]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/?p=2478</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[When some energy executives and their lawyers hear “investment protection” they think arbitration. They picture a panel in some neutral city, elaborate briefs and a damages award to be executed on some asset somewhere. In “An Integrated Approach to International Energy Investment Protection,” we observe that protection doesn’t begin when the dispute starts. It begins [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When some energy executives and their lawyers hear “investment protection” they think arbitration. They picture a panel in some neutral city, elaborate briefs and a damages award to be executed on some asset somewhere. In “<a href="https://www.pillsburylaw.com/a/web/tWvpXJmmh6baZSARoeFrV9/protecting-international-energy-investments.pdf">An Integrated Approach to International Energy Investment Protection</a>,” we observe that protection doesn’t begin when the dispute starts. It begins long before the investment is even made.</p>
<p></p><p class="read_more_link"><a href="https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/integrated-international-investment-protection/">Continue reading →</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">2478</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Reported Draft Rules Signal New Semiconductor Export Controls Framework</title>
		<link>https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/reported-draft-rules-signal-new-semiconductor-export-controls-framework/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stephan E. Becker, Matthew Oresman, Matthew R. Rabinowitz, Roya Motazedi and Daniel Steinfeld]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Mar 2026 20:12:33 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Semiconductors]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/?p=2471</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[On March 5, news outlets reported that the U.S. government is drafting new export control regulations for AI chips. A copy of the draft regulations is not publicly available. According to reports, the draft regulations would cover most high-end processors sold by U.S. companies, positioning the U.S. as a gatekeeper for the global AI industry. Reports [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="xmsonormal">On March 5, news outlets reported that the U.S. government is drafting new export control regulations for AI chips. A copy of the draft regulations is not publicly available. According to <a href="https://url.us.m.mimecastprotect.com/s/oA-HC5yW5RuZ12KjvhzfRSkV_Fd?domain=news-api.bgov.com">reports</a>, the draft regulations would cover most high-end processors sold by U.S. companies, positioning the U.S. as a gatekeeper for the global AI industry.</p>
<p class="xmsonormal"></p><p class="read_more_link"><a href="https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/reported-draft-rules-signal-new-semiconductor-export-controls-framework/">Continue reading →</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">2471</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>USTR Launches New Slate of Section 301 Investigations Targeting Forced Labor Imports</title>
		<link>https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/ustr-new-section-301-investigations-forced-labor-imports/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Pillsbury Global Trade &amp; Sanctions Law Team]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Mar 2026 15:39:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Section 301]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/?p=2469</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Following its March 11 announcement of a Section 301 investigation focused on structural excess capacity, on March 12 the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) initiated new investigations into 60 of the United States’ largest trading partners, examining whether those countries have failed to impose and effectively enforce bans on the importation of goods [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Following its March 11 announcement of a Section 301 investigation focused on <a href="https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/ustr-section-301-investigations-into-structural-excess-capacity-16-economies/">structural excess capacity</a>, on March 12 the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) initiated new investigations into 60 of the United States’ largest trading partners, examining whether those countries have failed to impose and effectively enforce bans on the importation of goods produced with forced labor.</p>
<p></p><p class="read_more_link"><a href="https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/ustr-new-section-301-investigations-forced-labor-imports/">Continue reading →</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">2469</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>USTR Launches Section 301 Investigations Into Structural Excess Capacity Across 16 Economies</title>
		<link>https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/ustr-section-301-investigations-into-structural-excess-capacity-16-economies/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Pillsbury Global Trade &amp; Sanctions Law Team]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Mar 2026 15:30:13 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Section 301]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump Administration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/?p=2465</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[On March 11, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced the initiation of a series of Section 301 investigations under the Trade Act of 1974 into “structural excess capacity and production in manufacturing sectors.” The investigations target the following countries: China, the European Union, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Mexico, [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On March 11, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) <a href="https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/march/ustr-initiates-section-301-investigations-relating-structural-excess-capacity-and-production">announced</a> the initiation of a series of Section 301 investigations under the Trade Act of 1974 into “structural excess capacity and production in manufacturing sectors.” The investigations target the following countries: China, the European Union, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Japan and India. The Administration has identified these as countries that “appear to exhibit structural excess capacity in various manufacturing sectors, such as through large or persistent trade surpluses or underutilized or unused capacity.”</p>
<p></p><p class="read_more_link"><a href="https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/ustr-section-301-investigations-into-structural-excess-capacity-16-economies/">Continue reading →</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">2465</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>OFAC Issues Five Additional Venezuela General Licenses Authorizing Certain Oil-Related Activities</title>
		<link>https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/ofac-venezuela-general-licenses-authorizing-oil-activities/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christopher R. Wall, Stephan E. Becker, Aaron R. Hutman, Matthew R. Rabinowitz, Zachary C. Rozen, Samantha Franks, Erin Kwiatkowski and Daniel Steinfeld]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Feb 2026 19:00:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[OFAC Sanctions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Venezuela Sanctions]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/?p=2455</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In recent weeks, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has greatly expanded the scope of authorized activities and transactions that U.S. persons may undertake regarding energy projects in Venezuela. The expanded authorizations align with the wider U.S. strategy to relax certain sanctions after President Maduro’s removal on January 3, 2026, signaling [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In recent weeks, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has greatly expanded the scope of authorized activities and transactions that U.S. persons may undertake regarding energy projects in Venezuela. The expanded authorizations align with the wider U.S. strategy to relax certain sanctions after President Maduro’s removal on January 3, 2026, signaling a significant shift toward broader commercial engagement with Venezuela’s energy industry.</p>
<p></p><p class="read_more_link"><a href="https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/ofac-venezuela-general-licenses-authorizing-oil-activities/">Continue reading →</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">2455</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Supreme Court Invalidates IEEPA Tariffs: Implications and Next Steps</title>
		<link>https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/supreme-court-invalidates-ieepa-tariffs/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nancy A. Fischer, Stephan E. Becker, Daniel Porter, Sahar J. Hafeez, Gina M. Colarusso, Julian M. Beach, Ata A. Akiner and Taishu Pitt]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 20 Feb 2026 21:51:45 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Tariffs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump Administration]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/?p=2445</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[On February 20, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 6–3 decision (in Learning Resources v. Trump) holding that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, stated that if Congress intended to grant tariff authority under IEEPA, “it would have [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On February 20, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1287_4gcj.pdf">issued</a> a 6–3 decision (in <em>Learning Resources v. Trump</em>) holding that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.</p>
<p></p><p class="read_more_link"><a href="https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/supreme-court-invalidates-ieepa-tariffs/">Continue reading →</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">2445</post-id>	</item>
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