New Jersey Employment Lawyer Blog

New Jersey Supreme Court Reaffirms Lower Threshhold for Attorneys' Fees Enhancements

Fri, 03 Feb 2012 16:16:26 -0500

Last week, in Walker v. Guiffre and Humphries v. Powder Mill Shopping Plaza, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the longstanding rule that a plaintiff can receive an enhanced attorney fee award under New Jersey laws that allow a prevailing plaintiff to recover his attorneys' fees from the defendant. This applies to many New Jersey employment laws, including the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), and the New Jersey Family Leave Act (FLA).

This right to a contingency fee enhancement dates back to Rendine v. Pantzer, a 1995 New Jersey Supreme Court case which discusses an employee's right to recover his reasonable attorney's fees if he wins a case under the LAD. After the court calculates the attorneys' reasonable fee, it must determine whether and how much of an enhancement he should receive. The fee enhancement is intended to make up for the risk a lawyer takes when taking a case on a contingency fee basis. Contingency fee enhancements generally should range between five and fifty percent, and typically range between twenty and thirty-five percent. The maximum possible fee enhancement under New Jersey law is 100 percent, but such a high enhancement is available only in a "rare and exceptional case."

In contrast, in April 2010, in Perdue v. Kenny A., the United States Supreme Court recognized that, under federal law, an attorney fee enhancement is permitted only in "rare" and "exceptional" circumstances. Fortunately, in Walker and Humphries the New Jersey Supreme Court decided not to follow Perdue, and instead continued to follow Rendine. As a result, employees who bring claims under New Jersey fee-shifting statutes such as the LAD, CEPA and the FLA are entitled to seek enhanced attorney fees. However, employees bringing claims under federal employment laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA), are rarely entitled to fee enhancements.

New Jersey Passes Trade Secrets Act

Mon, 30 Jan 2012 15:45:00 -0500

New Jersey law prohibits employees from disclosing or using certain confidential information that belong to their employers. Since many companies are sensitive about having their trade secrets used by their competitors, they frequently require employees to sign confidentiality and trade secret agreements prohibiting employees from using or disclosing their confidential information. Employees should be aware that earlier this month employers gained additional protection for their trade secrets when Governor Christopher Christie signed the New Jersey Trade Secrets Act into law.

What Does The New Jersey Trade Secrets Act Prohibit?

The New Jersey Trade Secrets Act prohibits individuals from misappropriating someone else's trade secret. It defines "misappropriation" as (1) obtaining someone else's trade secret from someone who you know or have reason to know obtained it improper means; or (2) disclosing or using someone else's trade secret without their consent if you: (a) used improper means to learn it; or (b) knew or had reason to know it was obtained by improper means when you disclosed or used it; or (c) knew or had reason to know it was obtained by improper means before you materially change your position based on it. It defines a "trade secret" as information in any form that has actual or potential economic value because it is not generally known or knowable by others through a proper means, but only if the owner of the information uses reasonable efforts to keep it secret.

What Damages Are Available Under the New Jersey Trade Secrets Act?

The New Jersey Trade Secrets Act allows someone who had its trade secrets misappropriated to recover any actual damages it suffered, plus any money the person misappropriating the trade secret unjustly earned as a result. Alternatively, a company can recover the amount of a reasonable royalty from the person who misappropriated its trade secret. In addition, the Act permits a court to issue an injunction preventing an actual or threatened misappropriation of a trade secret. It also allows a court to award punitive damages if the misappropriation was willful and malicious. However, the punitive damages cannot be more than twice the actual damages award. Moreover, under limited circumstances a court also has the right to require the losing party to pay the winning party's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.

How Quickly Does Someone Have to Bring a Claim Under the New Jersey Trade Secrets Act?

For most situations, the New Jersey Trade Secrets Act has a three year statute of limitations. That means an employer cannot bring a claim under the Act if it waited more than three years after it either knew about the misappropriation, or would have known about it if it had exercised reasonable diligence. However, the Act indicates that a continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim, which means that the three year statute of limitations does not begin to run until the misappropriation stops. Perhaps more importantly, even if the New Jersey Trades Secrets Act does not apply, other legal obligations, including any provisions in your employment contract, still might apply.

When Does the New Jersey Trade Secrets Act Go Into Effect?

The New Jersey Trade Secrets Act is a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. It has been adopted by most states, but has not been adopted in New York. The New Jersey version went into effect immediately, but does not apply to misappropriations that occurred before January 9, 2012, including ongoing misappropriations that began prior to January 9.

What Can I Do if My Employer Claims I Misappropriated a Trade Secret?

It can be a very serious matter if your current or former employer claims you misappropriated one of its trade secrets. Contact an experienced employment law attorney who can help defend your legal rights.

Religious Ministers Are Not Protected by Anti-Discrimination Laws

Thu, 12 Jan 2012 11:00:00 -0500

Yesterday, a unanimous United States Supreme Court ruled that ministerial employees of religious groups cannot bring employment discrimination claims against the religious groups for which they work. It ruled that those claims would violate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

The case involved Cheryl Perich, a teacher for the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School. Ms. Perich took time off because she had a disability, narcolepsy. When she tried to return to work, the Church fired her. The Church specifically stated that Ms. Perich's threat to bring a discrimination lawsuit against it was one of the reasons it fired her.

Ms. Perich then filed a Charge of Discrimination with the United States Equal Opportunity Commission (EEOC). She claimed the Church had wrongfully terminated her employment, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by firing her because she has a disability, and in retaliation for her threat to bring a disability discrimination lawsuit. The EEOC eventually filed a lawsuit against the Church, alleging it fired Ms. Perich in violation of the ADA.

The Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment requires a ministerial exception to federal and state anti-discrimination laws. Specifically, it held that "requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so . . . interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs." It concluded this would violate the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause because it would be a government interference with an internal church decision that impacts the church's faith and mission. As a result, the Supreme Court ruled that Ms. Perich cannot proceed with her lawsuit.

The Court did not define who is a "minister" protected by this exception. However, it found Ms. Perich was a "minister" even though she was a teacher. It based its conclusion on facts including, among other factors, that (1) the Church commissioner her as a minister, (2) she had substantial religious training and had to pass an oral examination before she could be commissioned as a minister, (3) she held herself out as a minister and received a special housing allowance and tax benefits as a result, (4) she was assigned to perform her job "according to the Word of God," (5) her job duties required her to teach the "Word of God" and to lead her students in prayer three times a day, and (6) twice a year she lead a school-wide chapel service.

The Supreme Court noted that it was not deciding whether the ministerial exception bars other types of lawsuits against religious groups, such as lawsuits for breach of employment contracts or personal injury claims against religious employers.

Is Your Non-compete Agreement Enforceable in New York?

Wed, 11 Jan 2012 16:45:00 -0500

Under New York law, non-compete agreements and other restrictive covenants in employment contracts are disfavored, and are enforceable only in limited circumstances. New York courts enforce non-competes only if all three of the following conditions are met:

1. The non-compete is reasonably limited in scope and duration;

2. The restrictions are no greater than necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interests;

3. The non-compete is not harmful to the general public;

4. The non-compete is not unreasonably burdensome to the employee.

Even when those four requirements are met, an employer seeking to enforce a non-compete agreement has to prove it is not merely seeking to use the non-compete agreement to prevent competition. Instead, it has to show the non-compete is necessary to protect its legitimate interests, such as to prevent the employee from using or disclosing its trade secrets or confidential information, to protect the company's goodwill, or to prevent special harm due to the unique nature of the employee's job.

There are few bright line rules regarding when a non-compete agreement is reasonable. In deciding whether a restrictive covenant is reasonable, courts consider a number of factors and balance the right of the employee to work and earn a living against the importance of the restrictions to protect the employer's business. In terms of duration, covenants not to compete for 6 months or less are generally reasonable. New York courts have approved non-competes lasting up to two years when the restrictions are otherwise reasonable and not too burdensome for the employee.

If an employee is receiving compensation from her former employer during the period when she is supposed to refrain from competition, such as severance pay or garden leave pay, the non-compete is more likely to be upheld.

Even when a non-compete agreement is reasonable, it is still unenforceable if the employer fired the employee without good cause. Likewise, a reasonable covenant not to compete is unenforceable if the employer breached the employee's employment contract.

Attorneys, as well as stock brokers and other registered representatives under Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), should be aware that special rules apply to their non-compete agreements in New York. For example, agreements that restrict attorneys from practicing law are unenforceable, except as a condition for receiving retirement benefits. Likewise, contracts that prohibit customers from continuing to use the services of their registered representative are not enforceable.

Job Candidate Can Pursue Age Discrimination Claim Based on Decision by Independent Contractor

Wed, 28 Dec 2011 19:26:44 -0500

Late last month, a Federal Judge in the Southern District of New York ruled that a job candidate can continue with his age discrimination claim against a prospective employer based on a discriminatory hiring decision made by independent contractors who had the apparent authority to make hiring decisions on the employer's behalf. Apparent authority is when a company's actions lead someone else to incorrectly believe that he or she is an employee or agent of the company. This decision follows an earlier decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the same case, which recognized that Employers Can Be Held Liable for Discriminatory Hiring Decisions Made By Independent Contractors.

The case, Halpert v. Manhattan Apartments, Inc., involves Michael Halpert, who was applying for a position as a "shower" for Manhattan Apartments, Inc. He was interviewed by Robert Brooks, a salesperson who worked for Manhattan Apartments as an independent contractor. Mr. Brooks did not have the authority to hire employees on behalf of Manhattan Apartments.

During Mr. Halpert's job interview, Mr. Brooks indicated that Mr. Halpert was "too old" for the job. Several days later, Manhattan Apartments' receptionist said the company was not hiring Mr. Halpert because "we were looking for someone younger." Mr. Brooks then repeated that Mr. Halpert was not qualified for the job because of his age.

Mr. Halpert sued Manhattan Apartments, claiming it failed to hire him because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). After the Second Circuit ruled that an employer could potentially be held liable for the actions of an independent contractor, Manhattan Apartments filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Halpert was not its employee or agent, and there was not enough evidence to prove Mr. Brooks had the apparent authority to hire employees on its behalf.

However, the District Court disagreed. It found there was enough evidence for a jury to conclude that Manhattan Apartments had the apparent authority to hire Mr. Halpert. This evidence includes the fact that Manhattan Apartments allowed Mr. Brooks to use its offices, to answer his phones by saying "Manhattan Apartments, Inc.," and to use business card that identify himself as a "Licensed Assc. Broker" for "Manhattan Apartments Inc." It also included the fact that Manhattan Apartments' receptionist explained the decision not to hire Mr. Halpert by saying that "we were looking for someone younger." It therefore denied Manhattan Apartments' motion for summary judgment to potentially give Mr. Brooks an opportunity to prove his case at a trial.

New York City Clarifies Right to Reasonable Accommodations for Religious Beliefs

Fri, 16 Dec 2011 13:34:03 -0500

Earlier this year, Mayor Michael Bloomberg signed into law an amendment to the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). The amendment clarifies when employers in New York City are required to provide reasonable accommodations for the religious observances and practices of their employees and prospective employees.

Employers must provide reasonable accommodations unless they cause the employer an undue hardship. The amendment to the NYCHRL indicates that some of the factors to consider when determining if an accommodation causes an undue hardship include:

1. The nature and cost of the accommodation;
2. The financial resources of the facility;
3. The number of employees working at the facility;
4. The effect providing the accommodation would have the facility's expenses and resources;
5. The overall financial resources of the employer;
6. The number of employees working for the employer;
7. The number, type, and location of the employer's facilities;
8. The composition and functions of the employer's workforce; and
9. How geographically spread out or close together the employer's facilities are.

The amendment also makes it clear that the employer has the burden to prove that an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on it. However, it makes it clear that an employer is not required to provide a reasonable accommodation for an employee's religious practice or belief if the employee would be unable to perform the essential functions of his or her job even with the accommodation.

New York State, New Jersey, and federal law already require employers to provide reasonable accommodations for employees' religious belief. However, this law is significant because New York City law has been interpreted very broadly. For example, as discussed in a previous article, New York's Appellate Division has ruled, in the context of reasonable accommodations for a disability, that an Extended Medical Leave Can Be Reasonable Accommodation Under New York Law.

New Jersey Appellate Court Rejects 50% Reduction to Attorney's Fees Award in Whistleblower Lawsuit

Fri, 09 Dec 2011 18:15:10 -0500

The New Jersey Appellate Division recently ruled, in an employment law case in which the same law firm represented two clients, and only one of those clients won at trial, it was improper to reduce the attorney's fee award by 50%. Many employment laws, including New Jersey's Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), allow an employee who wins his case to recover his reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Ordinarily, when an attorney achieves excellent results for his client, he should be awarded all of his attorney's fees. Otherwise, the judge can reduce the fee based on the time that he finds was unnecessary or unreasonable.

The case, Donelson v. DuPont, involved two employees. Joseph Donelson brought a whistleblower claim under CEPA and an age discrimination claim under the LAD. However, he lost his case at trial. The other employee, John Seddon, brought a whistleblower claim under CEPA. Seddon won at trial, and the jury awarded him $724,000 in economic damages, plus $500,000 in punitive damages. As I discussed in June, in an earlier decision stemming from Donelson, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that New Jersey Employees Can Recover Lost Wages if Forced to Resign Because Retaliation Caused Psychiatric Disorder. But the Court sent the case back to the Appellate Division to decide whether the trial court had properly reduced Seddon's attorney's fees.

Since Seddon and Donelson were represented by the same lawyer, and their cases were factually related, it was difficult to determine how much of the total time the lawyers spent on the case was necessary to Seddon's case, and how much was only necessary for Donelson's case. As a result, the trial judge decided to cut Seddon's attorney's fee award in half.

The Appellate Division ruled that, when the trial judge calculated Seddon's attorney's fees, it was proper to consider the fact that Donelson lost his LAD case. However, it found it was improper to reduce Seddon's attorney's fee by 50 percent because Donelson would have been a witness in Seddon's case even if he was not a party to the lawsuit, and his attorney would have had to spend much of the same time either way. Accordingly, the Appellate Division sent the case back to the trial court to reassess the appropriate attorney's fee.

Beware: Your Boss Might Read Your Posts on Social Networking Sites

Thu, 17 Nov 2011 11:01:12 -0500

I often read status updates on sites like Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter reflecting my friends' feeling about their work, bosses, and co-workers. It is worth a reminder that such postings potentially can be used against you in an employment law case, such as a discrimination, harassment, or retaliation lawsuit. If your profile is public, or if one of your supervisors is your "friend," your employer will have easy access to that information. But your employer might be able to obtain the information in a lawsuit even if it was originally visible only to individuals who you have accepted as "contacts" or "friends."

For example, one of my clients recently received the following request from a large law firm that represents employers:

Produce a copy of the contents of Plaintiff's account on any social media websites, such as Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.

I intend to object to this request because it is nothing more than a fishing expedition, and the employer is seeking information that is not relevant to the case. But there are many ways in which your posts may be relevant to an employment law matter. For example, if you are having a good day at work and post "I love my job," that could be used against you to prove you did not experience a hostile work environment, and therefore harm your harassment claim. On the other hand, if you express negative feelings about your boss, co-workers, clients, or customers, then you could be accused of disparaging your employer, which could violate an internal company policy, your employment contract, or your duty of loyalty to your employer.

It is important to realize that, unless you delete it, all of the data you have posted on Facebook, including wall posts, photos with comments, videos, private messages, friend lists and other user profile content, remains accessible in an archive that is fairly easy to retrieve. You can download it from the Account Settings menu. Thus, even very old posts could hurt you if the employment relationship goes bad. Be very careful about what information you post about your job on social networking websites. At the very least, you should not post anything about your current or former employer that you would not want the employer to read.

However, once you are considering filing a lawsuit, you cannot erase your archive because you would be destroying potential evidence in your case, and you could be penalized. For example, in Lester v. Allied Concrete, a plaintiff who prevailed in a wrongful death case was ordered to pay a $180,000 fine for deleting his Facebook profile.

Jury to Decide Whether Caswell-Massey Discriminated Against Disabled Employee With Sleep Apnea

Mon, 07 Nov 2011 16:42:00 -0500

Last month, in Gibbs v. Caswell-Massey, New Jersey's Appellate Division ruled that Linda Gibbs could proceed with her disability discrimination lawsuit against her former employer, Caswell-Massey. Caswell-Massey is a luxury bath and body products company in Edison, New Jersey. It hired Ms. Gibbs in 1993 . She was gradually promoted through the company's ranks, and eventually became its Corporate Manager, Retail Stores and International Sales.

In 2000, Ms. Gibbs's doctor diagnosed her with sleep apnea. This disability causes Ms. Gibbs fatigue, and often makes it difficult for her to stay awake at work. For example, she occasionally nods off at her desk. Caswell-Massey warned Ms. Gibbs on several occasions that her unexcused absences, sleeping, and poor job performance were unacceptable, and that she could be fired if she had any further performance issues. Nonetheless, Ms. Gibbs received an overall performance rating of "above overall expectations" in both 2005 and 2006.

In November 2006, Ms. Gibbs took a four-week disability leave to have hernia surgery. The company fired her two days after she returned to work. It claims its decision to fire was based on information it received from Steven Culter during Ms. Gibbs's disability leave. Mr. Cutler was business partners with Ms. Gibbs' husband. He and Mr. Gibbs apparently worked together at the Route 18 flea market in East Brunswick, New Jersey. Mr. Cutler claimed that Ms. Gibbs was stealing products from Caswell-Massey, and her husband was selling them at the flea market. He eventually provided the company with photographs of Caswell-Massey's products that he was selling at the flea market, a copy of a book with Gibbs's handwriting that listed prices for Caswell-Massey products, and his own sworn statement claiming Ms. Gibbs admitted she had taken products from Caswell-Massey.

Caswell-Massey investigated Mr. Cutler's allegations. During the investigation, Ms. Gibbs claimed she did not know her husband was selling Caswell-Massey products at the flea market. She also claimed that Mr. Cutler was blackmailing her, and provided evidence including threatening voicemail messages that Mr. Cutler had left her. Caswell-Massey suspended Ms. Gibbs without pay while it conducted its investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation, it fired Ms. Gibbs, supposedly because she had violated the non-compete provision in her employment contract.

The trial court dismissed Ms. Gibbs's case, including her claim that Caswell-Massey fired her because of her disability in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). It ruled that she did not have enough evidence to prove that Caswell-Massey's explanation for firing her was a pretext, or excuse, for discrimination.

The Appellate Division disagreed. It held that a reasonable jury could believe that Caswell-Massey discriminated against Ms. Gibbs, based on evidence supporting the conclusion that the company conducted an inept and cursory investigation, relied on Mr. Cutler's statements even though he was a biased and questionable source, and ignored Ms. Gibbs' 13 year history with the company, in addition to the lack of evidence that Ms. Gibbs' husband ever sold a single Caswell-Massey product. However, the Court also indicated that a jury could come to the opposite conclusion, and could find that the company fired Ms. Gibbs because she violated her non-compete agreement. As a result, the Appellate Division sent the case back to the trial court, so a jury can decide whether Ms. Gibbs has proved that Caswell-Massey illegally discriminated against her.

New Jersey Court Rules Jury Must Decide If Employer is Responsible for Coworker's Sexual Harassment

Wed, 26 Oct 2011 16:25:34 -0500

Earlier this month, New Jersey's Appellate Division reversed a trial court's decision to dismiss two employees' sexual harassment case against their employer, the Mercer County Youth Detention Center. In Wallace v. Mercer County Youth Detention Center, the Appellate Division ruled that a jury needs to decide whether the employer's anti-harassment policy was effective. Employers can be held liable under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) for sexual harassment committed by a coworker if the employer did not have an effective anti-harassment policy.

Moneck Wallace and Tina Stewart, two female employees who worked for the Mercer County Youth Detention Center, claim a male coworker, Jerel Livingston, sexually harassed them. Ms. Wallace and Ms. Stewart both complained about the sexual harassment. After conducting an investigation, the employer concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support their claims. The two women then filed a sexual harassment lawsuit.

The trial judge dismissed the case even though it found that Ms. Wallace and Ms. Stewart had enough evidence to prove that Mr. Livingston sexually harassed them. However, it concluded that their employer could not be held liable for the harassment because the alleged harasser was not a supervisor, and Ms. Wallace and Ms. Stewart did not have any evidence that their employer was aware of the harassment but failed to respond to it.

The Appellate Division disagreed with the trial court's decision to dismiss the case. It explained that an employee might be able to prove her employer is liable for harassment committed by a supervisor or coworker if the employer did not have an effective anti-harassment policy.

The Appellate Division concluded that Ms. Wallace and Ms. Stewart had enough evidence to allow a jury to conclude that Mercer County did not have an effective anti-harassment policy. This included evidence that it:

Did not effectively inform its employees about its sexual harassment policy;
Did not provide adequate anti-harassment training to its employees;
Did not effectively enforce its anti-harassment policy;
Did not conduct a sufficient investigation into the alleged sexual harassment;
Did not use clear criteria when it evaluated whether the sexual harassment claim was substantiated; and
Did not have effective procedures to evaluate whether its sexual harassment policy was effective.

As a result, the Appellate Division sent the case back for a trial at which a jury will decide those issues.

Employer's Failure to Follow Job Restructuring Plan Could Prove Discrimination

Tue, 18 Oct 2011 10:51:00 -0500

New Jersey's Appellate Division recently ruled that when a company does not follow through with the plan it used to justify firing an employee, such as its plan for a reorganization or reduction in force, that failure can be enough for a jury to conclude that the decision to fire the employee was discriminatory.

In Abraham v. American International Group, Inc., Lisbi Abraham sued American International Group (AIG) claiming the company fired him because of his race and national origin, in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). Mr. Abraham is a United States citizen of Indian descent. His was AIG's Chief Technology Officer (CTO) for the company's Domestic Brokerage and Information Services Groups. The LAD prohibits companies from firing employees based on their race or national origin.

In October 2005, AIG issued a report which concluded that it should eliminate 13 of its 20 CTO positions. In May 2006, AIG fired Mr. Abraham. AIG claimed it fired him because it was restructuring the Information Services Group to eliminate duplication and redundancy of job functions.

The Appellate Division explained that one way a plaintiff can prove discrimination is by offering evidence that discredits the employer's explanation for its actions. It ruled that Mr. Abraham had evidence to discredit AIG's claim that it fired him as part of a job restructuring. In particular, although several other people temporarily took over Mr. Abraham's job duties after he was fired, none of his functions were permanently transferred to other employees. Since there is evidence that Mr. Abraham's job never was merged into another job, as AIG claimed it intended to do when it justified firing Mr. Abraham, the Appellate Division ruled that a jury could conclude that AIG fired him because of his race or national origin.

The Appellate Division was careful to recognize that courts should not act as "super-personnel departments," or second-guess employment decisions such as job restructuring. However, it also recognized that companies can violate the LAD in many "subtle and nuanced ways," that there is rarely "smoking gun" evidence to prove discrimination, and that often there are not even any overt acts of discrimination. The court concluded that, after a trial, a jury could find that AIG discriminated against Mr. Abraham because of his race or national origin, or it could find that AIG's decision to fire him was legitimate. It therefore sent his case back for a trial.

Third Circuit Finds Newark Hiring Practice Might Discriminate Based on Race

Thu, 06 Oct 2011 11:46:00 -0500

Last week, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that statistical evidence could be enough to prove that Newark's residency requirement for its non-uniformed employees has a disparate impact based on race. A disparate impact claim is when someone claims that a seemingly neutral policy has a disproportionately negative impact on a particular legally protected group.

Specifically, in Meditz v. City of Newark, Gregory Meditz sued Newark after it refused to hire him as its Housing Development Analyst because he lives in Rutherford, rather than in Newark, New Jersey. He claims the Newark's residency requirement for its non-uniformed employees is illegal because it has a disparate impact on non-Hispanic whites, since the population of Newark does not reflect the racial mix of the relevant job market. He alleges that fewer non-Hispanic white employees work for Newark as non-uniformed employees because of the residency requirement.

To support his claim, Mr. Meditz used statistics showing there is a much lower percentage of non-Hispanic white employees who work for Newark in non-uniformed positions (1) than there are in the general population of Newark, (2) than work for Newark in uniformed positions than non-uniformed positions, (3) than work for the government and private companies in Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Morris, Passaic, and Union Counties, and (4) than work for the Essex County government in Newark.

Despite this evidence, the District Court dismissed Mr. Meditz's employment discrimination lawsuit, finding his statistical evidence was not enough to prove that Newark's residency requirement has a disparate impact based on race. The lower court relied on the fact that "Newark is New Jersey's largest city with over 270,000 residents, 38,950 of whom are White." It concluded that "[g]iven its diversity and large population, there is no need to redefine the relevant labor market past city limits for purposes of Title VII analysis." Title VII is a federal employment law that prohibits employers from discriminating based on an employee's race, color, national origin, or gender.

However, the Court of Appeals disagreed and allowed Mr. Meditz to proceed with his case. It found his statistical evidence might be enough to prove that Newark's residency requirement has a disparate impact based on race. However, it ruled that the District Court has to determine the relevant labor market before it can determine whether Mr. Meditz's statistics prove his claim. The Third Circuit concluded that the District Court must consider factors including geographic location, available transportation to Newark, commuting patterns, and where employees working for private companies in Newark live.

If Mr. Meditz can prove that Newark's residency requirement has a disparate impact based on race, then Newark's only defense would be that it has a "business necessity" for having a residency policy. That means Newark would have to prove that the hiring criteria "must effectively measure the minimum qualifications for successful performance of the job in question." Otherwise, its residency requirement would have an illegal disparate impact based on race, in violation of Title VII.

Employee Alleges New Jersey Judiciary Failed to Accommodate His Disability

Fri, 30 Sep 2011 14:40:04 -0500

In two previous articles, I discussed the case of Thomas Bowers, an Information Technology Analyst who successfully appealed his race discrimination claim and his retaliation claim against the New Jersey Judiciary. Mr. Bowers was also successful on his appeal of his claims that the judiciary forced him to resign by refusing to provide him a reasonable accommodation for his disability, in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD).

Mr. Bowers claims he experienced mental and physical distress as a result of the race discrimination, harassment, and retaliation he experienced at work. His doctor diagnosed him with Anxiety Disorder, and suggested that he take medical leave from June 6 to July 1, 2007. Mr. Bowers' doctor subsequently extended his medical several times, and ultimately indicated Mr. Bowers would be ready to return to work on October 1, 2007.

On August 30, 2007, the Judiciary warned Mr. Bowers he was about to exceed his 12 weeks of protected FMLA leave. It told him he could extend his leave of absence by using his vacation time, but that he would run out of vacation time on September 6. The Judiciary warned Mr. Bowers that if he did not return to work by September 10, it would consider him to be on "an unauthorized leave of absence," and he would be subject to discipline.

On September 4, Mr. Bowers' lawyer informed the Judiciary that Mr. Bowers would not return to work until October 1. The Judiciary responded that it expected him to return to work on September 10, and repeated that he would be subject to discipline if he did not return to work by that date. The Judiciary claimed it had "experienced significant operational hardship during his absence," and could not accommodate his disability as a result. The Judiciary subsequently fired Mr. Bowers, effective September 10, 2007, because he had failed to return to work.

The Appellate Division concluded that a jury could reasonably conclude that the Judiciary failed to provide Mr. Bowers a reasonable accommodation for his disability, in violation of the LAD. It noted that Monmouth County did not post Mr. Bowers' vacant position until October 2008, and did not fill his position until January 20, 2009. It is unclear why the Judiciary could not have accommodated Mr. Bowers' disability by placing him on an unpaid medical leave through the end of September, and allowing him to return to work on October 1. If it had done so, his position would have been vacant for only 3 weeks, instead of remaining vacant until January 20. The Court noted that although the Judiciary claims budgetary constraints prevented it from replacing Mr. Bowers' sooner, a jury might reach a different conclusion. Accordingly, it found that the evidence could support a claim of failure to accommodate a disability in violation of the LAD.

New Jersey Judiciary Faces Retaliation Lawsuit

Mon, 26 Sep 2011 14:35:52 -0500

Last week, I discussed the case of Thomas Bowers, an IT Professional who won his appeal of his race discrimination case against the New Jersey Judiciary. That case, Bowers v. New Jersey Judiciary, Superior Court of New Jersey, Monmouth Vicinage, also discusses Mr. Bowers' retaliation claim.

Mr. Bowers filed an internal Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") complaint with his employer, the New Jersey Judiciary. He claimed his new supervisor, Troy Fitzpactrick, was harassing him because of his race. For example, he indicated that Mr. Fitzpatrick gave him assignments with unrealistic deadlines.

According to Mr. Bowers, the day after Mr. Bowers was interviewed about his EEO complaint, Mr. Fitzpatrick called him into his office and asked him about his complaint and work assignments. That meeting eventually became heated, and Mr. Fitzpatrick made threatening statements. Three days later, Mr. Bowers filed a second EEO complaint about Mr. Fitzpatrick's behavior during that meeting.

Mr. Bowers then went on a medical leave due to anxiety and stress caused by the harassment and discrimination he had been experiencing at work. During the first month of Mr. Bowers' medical leave, several Judiciary employees and a sheriff's officer came to Mr. Bowers' home to take back his laptop, supposedly because they were investigating a security breach. However, there is evidence that the Judiciary had little or no reason to suspect that Mr. Bowers was involved in that security breach.

Approximately three months later, the Judiciary terminated Mr. Bowers' employment, claiming he "abandoned" his job. However, at that point Mr. Bowers still had not been cleared to return from his medical leave.

The trial court dismissed Mr. Bowers' retaliation claim, concluding that the lower-level job duties he was assigned were part of his job description, his argument with Fitzpatrick and the confiscation of his laptop were not legally actionable, and his termination was not retaliatory. But New Jersey's Appellate Division found these conclusions were reasonable, but that it was possible that a jury would instead find that some or all of the Judiciary's actions toward Mr. Bowers were retaliatory. It therefore sent Mr. Bowers' case back to the trial court, to give him an opportunity to try to prove his retaliation claim.

The Appellate Division's decision also addressed Mr. Bowers' claim that the Judiciary failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for his disability, Anxiety Disorder. I will discuss that aspect of his case in my next article.

IT Professional Given Second Chance in Race Discrimination Case Against New Jersey Judiciary

Tue, 20 Sep 2011 12:49:31 -0500

On August 29, 2011, in Bowers v. New Jersey Judiciary, Superior Court of New Jersey, Monmouth Vicinage, New Jersey's Appellate Division reversed a trial court's decision dismissing Thomas Bower's lawsuit against his former employer, the New Jersey Judiciary. Thomas Bowers, an African-American, worked for the New Jersey Judiciary as an Information Technology Analyst. He claimed the Judiciary failed to promote him to Acting IT Manager and subjected him to a hostile work environment because of his race. Mr. Bowers was the only African-American in Monmouth County's IT Division. In fact, there were no other African-American IT managers in the entire New Jersey Judiciary, and only one other racial minority, an Asian Indian.

Beginning in July 2005, Mr. Bowers' supervisor took an extended medical leave. Shortly after, the Judiciary asked Mr. Bowers to take over the duties of IT Manager. This decision was subsequently recommended by Monmouth County's Assignment Judge. Mr. Bowers performed the duties of the IT supervisor for approximately 8 months.

But when the Judiciary sought to formally appoint him as its Acting IT Manager, the Assistant Director of Technical Services and Operations, Jonathon Massey, gave a very negative opinion of Mr. Bowers, including claiming he "doesn't understand simple technical things," he "is lazy and stands around and watches others do the work," and that another supervisor described him as a "cocky, arrogant, lazy, weasel, creep" who "does what he wants, doesn't tell the truth" and has a "chip on his shoulder." Not surprisingly, Mr. Bowers was not formally named the Acting IT Manager. However, informally he continued to perform the responsibilities of the IT Manager until April 2006, when the Judiciary named Troy Fitzpatrick its new permanent IT Manager.

After Mr. Fitzpatrick became the IT Manager, he gave Mr. Bowers assignments that were normally given to lower level and less senior IT employees, like answering Help Desk calls and creating a Help Desk manual. Mr. Fitzpatrick told Mr. Bowers that he could not assign work to anyone else, and also told him he could not leave his desk for any reason unless he found someone else to cover the Help Desk. Mr. Fitzpatrick also sought information from other employees about Mr. Bowers' work ethic, and was always short and curt when he spoke to Mr. Bowers, as if he did not want to speak to him. In comparison, Mr. Fitzpatrick treated a newly hired white male employee much better than Mr. Bowers, such as giving him less work and not limiting his ability to leave his desk.

The trial court dismissed Mr. Bowers' race discrimination and harassment claims because he was not subject to racial epithets and there was no direct evidence of race discrimination, he did not have enough evidence to prove either of those claims. But the Appellate Division disagreed. It explained that "discrimination rarely rears its ugly head directly. Rather, it typically manifests itself in subtle ways." In particular, it found that a jury could find that Mr. Massey's extremely negative recommendation was false and discriminatory. It noted that Mr. Massey admitted he knew very little about Mr. Bowers. Instead, it ruled that only a jury can decide whether the Judiciary's decision not to make Mr. Bowers its Acting IT Manager was discriminatory.

Next week, I will discuss Mr. Bowers' retaliation claim. In a subsequent article, I will discuss his claim that the judiciary failed to accommodate his disability.