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Workers’ Compensation Claim Allowed for COVID-19 and Stroke. Matter of Aungst v Family Dollar, 2025 NY Slip Op 06530

Stephen Bilkis — Tue, 31 Mar 2026 02:15:51 +0000

In Matter of Aungst v Family Dollar, the New York Court of Appeals considered whether a worker who contracted COVID-19 on the job could recover workers’ compensation benefits for that illness and for a later stroke that was claimed to be related to it. The case focused on how the Workers’ Compensation Board evaluates whether an illness arises out of and in the course of employment when the disease is widespread in the community and not tied to one single moment of exposure.

Background Facts

The claimant worked as a store manager for Family Dollar in April 2020, during the early period of the COVID-19 pandemic. He worked full time in a busy retail store that remained open as an essential business. According to his testimony, his work required frequent and close contact with the public, either on the sales floor or while serving as a cashier. He said that the employer did not provide employees with face masks or sneeze guards until the middle of April 2020. He also explained that although customers were supposed to wear masks and keep distance, store employees were told not to enforce those rules.

Hospital May Be Liable for Failing to Protect Patient from Assault. N. X. v. Cabrini Medical Center, 97 N.Y.2d 247 (2002)

Stephen Bilkis — Mon, 23 Feb 2026 20:44:20 +0000

In N. X. v. Cabrini Medical Center, the New York Court of Appeals addressed a hospital’s responsibility to protect a patient from harm while receiving medical care. The case involved a patient who alleged that she was assaulted by a doctor while recovering from surgery in a hospital recovery room. The court considered whether the hospital could be held liable for the conduct of its employee and whether the hospital staff failed to take steps to protect the patient.

The case raised questions about the limits of employer responsibility for employee conduct and the duty owed by hospital staff to patients who may be unable to protect themselves. The court examined how these legal principles apply when harm is caused by a hospital employee acting for personal reasons and when hospital staff may have been in a position to observe warning signs before the harm occurred.

Background Facts

Church Could Face Claims for Negligent Retention and Supervision. Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d 159 (2d Dep’t 1997)

Stephen Bilkis — Mon, 16 Feb 2026 23:07:14 +0000

In Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, the Appellate Division, considered whether a religious institution could be sued for claims based on its handling of a priest who later sexually abused children. The case did not turn on whether the abuse occurred. The priest had already pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the third degree based on the conduct alleged in the civil action. Instead, the court examined which legal theories could proceed against the Diocese itself.

Background Facts

The plaintiffs alleged that between July 1983 and August 1989 they were sexually abused by Enrique Diaz Jimenez, an ordained Roman Catholic priest. The abuse formed the basis for civil claims against both Jimenez and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn. Jimenez later pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the third degree based on this conduct.

Failure to Exhaust and Deliberate Indifference Standards Applied to Inmate Medical Claim. Sonds v. St. Barnabas Correctional Health Services, 151 F. Supp. 2d 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)

Stephen Bilkis — Mon, 26 Jan 2026 13:10:41 +0000

When an incarcerated person claims that prison officials denied medical care, federal law sets clear requirements. Before filing a lawsuit in federal court, an inmate must first use the prison grievance system. In addition, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of medical care, the inmate must show that officials were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Courts apply both procedural and substantive rules in reviewing these cases.

In Sonds v. St. Barnabas Correctional Health Services, 151 F. Supp. 2d 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York examined both requirements. The court addressed whether the plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act and whether the facts alleged satisfied the constitutional standard for deliberate indifference.

Background Facts

Liability for inmate-on-inmate assault. Sanchez v. State of New York, 99 N.Y.2d 247 (2002)

Stephen Bilkis — Fri, 16 Jan 2026 13:08:21 +0000

Under New York law, the State has a duty to protect inmates in its custody from reasonably foreseeable harm. In correctional facilities, this duty includes taking reasonable steps to prevent assaults by other inmates. The State is not an insurer of inmate safety. It is responsible only for risks that it knew or should have known about under the circumstances.

In Sanchez v. State of New York, 99 N.Y.2d 247 (2002), the Court of Appeals addressed how courts should analyze foreseeability in an inmate-on-inmate assault case. The decision clarified the scope of the State’s duty and explained when a negligence claim against the State may proceed to trial.

Background Facts

Correctional Facility Liability for Inmate Assault: Rodriguez v. City of New York, 38 A.D.3d 349 (1st Dep’t 2007)

Stephen Bilkis — Fri, 09 Jan 2026 13:01:41 +0000

New York law requires correctional authorities to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from foreseeable harm. While the State and municipalities are not insurers of inmate safety, they owe a duty of care to safeguard those in custody from reasonably foreseeable risks, including inmate-on-inmate violence. When an assault occurs in a detention facility, courts examine whether officials had actual or constructive notice of a risk and whether they failed to take reasonable measures to prevent harm. In Rodriguez v. City of New York, 38 A.D.3d 349 (1st Dep’t 2007), the Appellate Division, First Department, reviewed whether the City could be held liable for a razor attack committed by one inmate against another inside a segregation unit.

Background Facts

On March 26, 1995, Alex Rivera was sleeping in his cell at the New York City Adolescent Reception and Detention Center in the Bronx. While he slept, another inmate, Curtis Armstrong, slashed him with a razor. Rivera sustained cuts to the back of his neck, the side of his face, and his arms.

Federal Court Reviews Excessive Force and Medical Care Claims in Newland v. Achute, 932 F. Supp. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)

Stephen Bilkis — Fri, 02 Jan 2026 12:48:55 +0000

Federal law allows incarcerated individuals to bring civil rights claims when they believe their constitutional rights were violated. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a person may sue state actors for conduct that deprives them of rights protected by the United States Constitution. In the prison setting, the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. Courts have held that this protection applies to claims involving excessive force and denial of medical care. In Newland v. Achute, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York examined whether a former inmate presented sufficient evidence to proceed with claims that correction staff used excessive force and denied him proper medical treatment.

Background Facts

Wayne C. Newland was incarcerated at the Adolescent Reception Detention Center (ARDC) on Rikers Island in December 1991. He had pleaded guilty to criminal possession of stolen property and was awaiting sentencing. According to court records, the facility had an order requiring that he be produced in court on December 18, 1991 for sentencing.

Second Circuit reviewed limits on qualified immunity in fabrication-of-evidence claims. Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000)

Stephen Bilkis — Fri, 12 Dec 2025 01:51:24 +0000

The Second Circuit considered whether a prosecutor who acted in an investigative role could face liability for fabricating evidence that later contributed to a loss of liberty. The case required the court to decide if a federal prosecutor could rely on qualified immunity when the complaint alleged that he created false evidence during the investigation and later used the same evidence before a grand jury. The appeal focused on the scope of the constitutional right at issue, the link between the alleged misconduct and the later loss of liberty, and whether that right was clearly established at the time of the events.

Background Facts

Zaher Zahrey filed a civil action in 1998 against New York City police officers and Kings County prosecutors. He claimed that the defendants conspired to create false evidence that tied him to robberies and a murder. He also named Assistant United States Attorney Martin Coffey, alleging that Coffey took part in the investigation before acting as a prosecutor. According to the complaint, the investigation began in 1994 after the death of William Rivera, a former auxiliary officer. Rivera’s family had asked Zahrey, who worked for the NYPD, to inquire about the status of the case. Internal Affairs detectives later interviewed witnesses, including inmate Sidney Quick, who eventually made statements that tied Zahrey to robberies. Quick first claimed that Zahrey took part in multiple robberies but then changed his story to statements about guns and drugs. Detectives also approached Lisa Rivera, who testified before a federal grand jury after receiving help and support from investigators.

Second Circuit addressed limits on § 1983 damages in challenges to convictions in Heck v. HumphreyHeck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)

Stephen Bilkis — Fri, 12 Dec 2025 01:48:55 +0000

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States Supreme Court considered whether a state prisoner could use a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to seek money damages based on claims that would call a criminal conviction into question. The case involved questions about the point at which a civil rights claim could move forward when the person bringing the claim remained subject to a conviction that had not been set aside in any court. The Court reviewed the interaction between the federal civil rights statute and the federal habeas corpus statute and explained how federal courts should handle damages claims tied to an outstanding state conviction.

Background Facts

Roy Heck was convicted in Indiana state court of voluntary manslaughter for the death of his wife. He received a 15-year sentence. While his direct appeal was still pending in the Indiana courts, Heck filed a civil action in the United States District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint named prosecutors and a state police investigator as defendants. Heck claimed that they engaged in unlawful acts that led to his arrest and conviction. He alleged that the investigators carried out an improper investigation, destroyed evidence that he stated could have helped him, and conducted an illegal voice identification procedure. He sought money damages. He did not seek release from custody or any injunctive relief.

Second Circuit determined summary judgment was improper on false arrest civil rights claims. Ackerson v. City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 2012)

Stephen Bilkis — Fri, 12 Dec 2025 01:20:58 +0000

This civil rights action arose from an arrest that stemmed from a report by a resident who said that a man approached her in her driveway and questioned her about her family. The arrest led to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York law. The case addressed the limits of probable cause, the scope of qualified immunity, and the level of supervision that municipalities must provide to officers. The appeal also involved questions related to false arrest and malicious prosecution.

Background Facts

On November 8, 2007, Shawn Ackerson approached a woman in her driveway. He asked about her household and said that her car had hit his earlier that day. The woman told him to leave and contacted the police. Officer Cotto responded and filed a report. The report noted that Ackerson said he found her address through her license plate and believed that her husband had been near a location linked to Ackerson’s former girlfriend. The woman also told officers that she feared Ackerson because she did not know him and felt unsafe during the encounter.