If you are facing DV charges in Seattle, Bellevue, or anywhere in the greater Puget Sound area, the attorneys at Blair & Kim can help you understand your options and mount an effective defense. Contact us for a confidential case evaluation.

What Happened in State v. Kane?

If you or someone you know is facing harassment charges in Washington, the attorneys at Blair & Kim can help you understand how this new ruling may affect your case. Contact us for a confidential case evaluation.

What Did the Court Decide in State v. Calloway?

Whether you are seeking a protection order or defending against one, the attorneys at Blair & Kim can help you navigate the process. Contact us for a confidential case evaluation.

What Happened in Sheridan?

If you are facing a divorce involving business assets, property division, or complex financial issues, the family law team at Blair & Kim can help. Contact us for a confidential case evaluation.

The Dispute: How Much Are Uncollected Fees Really Worth?

What Happened in the Hoffner Case?

The Hoffners’ divorce decree, based on a CR 2A agreement, required the husband to pay off a specific bank account debt—an Alaska account with a balance of approximately $57,600—that was connected to the wife’s car. The decree contemplated that proceeds from the sale of the marital home would cover this debt, but the home sold for less than expected, leaving about $27,000 still owed on the account. The husband agreed to pay the remaining balance in installments.

Then the wife’s car developed mechanical problems. The parties made a side agreement: the wife would trade in her car, the husband would cosign on a replacement vehicle, and the husband would make monthly payments on the new car’s loan until he had paid off the approximately $19,000 still owed from the original decree obligation. The husband also paid the insurance on the replacement car.

Before the husband finished paying down that amount, the replacement car was totaled in an accident. Insurance paid off the remaining loan on the replacement vehicle in full. The wife asked the husband to cosign on yet another car and resume payments for the amount insurance had covered. The husband refused. The wife filed a motion to enforce the original divorce decree.

The trial court denied the motion, finding that the debt the wife was trying to enforce had been extinguished by the insurance payment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Why Did the Side Agreement Backfire?

The original decree required the husband to pay a specific debt in a specific account for a specific dollar amount. When the parties informally agreed to “transfer” that obligation to a replacement car’s loan, they effectively replaced the decree’s terms with a new arrangement. Once insurance satisfied the replacement car’s debt in full, there was no remaining obligation tied to the original account—and the court found nothing left to enforce under the decree.

The wife argued that this was unjust: if the husband had paid off the original debt on schedule, she would have had both a paid-off car and insurance proceeds after the accident. The court acknowledged this argument but found that the husband’s obligation under the decree was to pay a certain debt, not to ensure the wife’s continued possession of a vehicle. Because the debt was satisfied—even if by insurance rather than by the husband’s payments—there was nothing left to enforce.

Critically, the side agreement between the parties was not formally documented in a way that preserved the wife’s rights. The court noted that a “waiver” allowing installment payments existed but was not part of the appellate record, and no written agreement clearly defined what would happen if the replacement car was lost before the husband finished paying.

What Can You Learn from This Case?

The Hoffner decision reinforces several principles that anyone involved in a Washington divorce should understand.

A divorce decree is a specific, enforceable order. When a decree assigns a particular debt to one spouse, the obligation is tied to that specific debt—not to a general promise to keep paying indefinitely. If the parties informally agree to redirect the obligation to a different debt, the original decree obligation may no longer be enforceable once the substitute debt is satisfied, even if the method of satisfaction was not what either party expected.

Informal agreements can undermine your decree rights. Side deals made after a divorce—especially ones that are not in writing or not approved by the court—can create ambiguity about what the decree actually requires. In Hoffner, the wife’s willingness to let the husband redirect his payments to a different vehicle ultimately left her without a clear enforcement mechanism when circumstances changed.

Always get modifications in writing and, ideally, approved by the court. Washington courts have broad equitable powers in family law matters under In re Marriage of Morris, 176 Wn. App. 893 (2013), and In re Marriage of Farmer, 172 Wn.2d 616 (2011). But absent certain conditions justifying the reopening of a decree, the trial court lacks authority to modify its terms. If you need to change how a decree obligation is fulfilled, the safest approach is to formalize the change through a stipulated order or agreed modification filed with the court.

Insurance proceeds can extinguish a debt obligation. If a decree obligation has been redirected to a specific loan and a third party—such as an insurance company—pays that loan in full, the court may find that the obligation no longer exists. This is true even if the outcome leaves one spouse worse off than they would have been under the original arrangement.

How Can You Protect Yourself When Modifying Divorce Obligations?

If you and your ex-spouse need to change how a decree obligation is fulfilled—whether it involves debt payments, property transfers, or support arrangements—there are steps you can take to protect your interests under Washington law.

Put everything in writing. Any agreement to modify how a decree obligation is satisfied should be documented in a written agreement signed by both parties. The agreement should specifically address what happens if circumstances change—for example, what happens if a vehicle is totaled, a property is damaged, or a refinancing falls through.

File a stipulated modification with the court. A written side agreement between ex-spouses is better than a verbal understanding, but it is not as strong as a court-approved modification. Under Washington law, a dissolution decree can be modified by stipulation of the parties if filed with and approved by the court. This gives both parties an enforceable court order rather than a private contract.

Do not assume your original decree protects you after a side deal. As Hoffner demonstrates, once you agree to redirect a decree obligation to a different debt or arrangement, the original decree terms may no longer be enforceable. Your attorney should review any proposed changes before you agree to them.

Consider the insurance implications. If a decree obligation is tied to a specific asset—like a car loan—and that asset is insured, think about what happens if insurance pays off the loan. Will the other spouse argue that the obligation has been satisfied? A well-drafted modification should address this scenario explicitly and specify whether the paying spouse’s obligation is to the other spouse personally or only to the specific lender. That distinction can determine whether the obligation survives when the debt is paid by a third party.

Talk to a Seattle Family Law Attorney About Enforcing Your Divorce Decree

Divorce decrees are designed to provide certainty. Informal side agreements can erode that certainty and leave you without an enforceable right when you need it most. Whether you are trying to enforce the terms of an existing decree, considering a modification, or responding to your ex-spouse’s request to change an obligation, getting legal advice before acting is the best way to protect yourself.

Blair & Kim’s family law team handles divorce enforcement, decree modifications, and property disputes across King County, Pierce County, and Snohomish County. To discuss your case with an experienced Seattle family law attorney, call Blair & Kim at (206) 622-6562 or contact the firm online.

What Happened in State v. Magana-Arevalo?

On December 1, 2018, at approximately 6:00 a.m., Renton police and a SWAT team arrived at Cristian Magaña Arévalo’s partner’s apartment. Officers used a bullhorn to order everyone out, separated Magaña Arévalo from his partner and young child, zip-tied his wrists behind his back, placed him in a patrol car, and drove him to a staging area in a grocery store parking lot surrounded by law enforcement vehicles and officers.

Once there, a detective removed the zip ties and told Magaña Arévalo he was “not under arrest and was free to leave at any time.” The detective then questioned him in the back of an unmarked work truck while another armed detective sat in the front seat. No Miranda warnings were given. Two days later, on December 3, a detective went to his home for a follow-up interview—again without Miranda warnings. The trial court admitted all of these statements into evidence.

Magaña Arévalo was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 320 months in prison plus a consecutive 60-month firearm enhancement.

What Did the Supreme Court Decide?

The Supreme Court’s en banc opinion addressed three major issues, each with practical consequences for criminal defendants in Washington.

“Not under arrest” does not mean you’re not in custody. The court held that an officer’s statement that a suspect is “free to leave” is just one factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis—it does not override other indicators of custody. Here, the totality included a SWAT team deployment at 6:00 a.m., physical restraint with zip ties, separation from family, transport to a police-controlled staging area, isolation for approximately 40–45 minutes, confrontation with incriminating evidence, and interrogation by two armed detectives in a vehicle. Under those circumstances, a reasonable person would not have felt free to end the encounter and leave, regardless of what the detective said.

Race and ethnicity matter in the custody analysis. Consistent with its companion decision in State v. Wasuge, No. 103530-6 (Wash. Jan. 15, 2026), the court held that a suspect’s race and ethnicity are relevant, objective factors in the Miranda custody determination. The court cited Washington-specific data showing that Latinos are killed by police at 1.3 times the rate of non-Hispanic white people and face higher rates of stops, use of force, and incarceration. Following State v. Sum, 199 Wn.2d 627 (2022), the court recognized that communities of color are “generally well aware of such patterns of excessive police scrutiny” and that this awareness makes encounters with law enforcement feel “more pointed and coercive.” Magaña Arévalo’s Latino ethnicity was one more factor supporting the finding of custody.

The harmless error test requires courts to weigh both sides. The court clarified Washington’s test for constitutional harmless error, resolving confusion in prior case law between the “overwhelming untainted evidence” test and the “contribution” test. Under the clarified standard, reviewing courts must consider both (1) the prejudicial or corrosive impact of the erroneously admitted evidence, including how it may have affected the jury’s view of even the properly admitted evidence, and (2) the strength of the properly admitted evidence of guilt. The State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

How Does This Affect Motions to Suppress in Washington?

Magana-Arevalo helps suppression motions in several ways. First, it makes clear that officers cannot immunize an interrogation from Miranda by simply telling a suspect they are “free to leave.” Defense attorneys can now point to this opinion when arguing that the surrounding circumstances—physical restraint, police-controlled location, separation from family, confrontation with evidence—are more significant than a verbal disclaimer.

Second, the opinion provides a detailed, factor-by-factor roadmap for building a custody argument: (a) whether the interrogation occurred in a police-controlled location, (b) whether the suspect was isolated from family, (c) whether officers woke the suspect, restrained them, or restricted movement, (d) whether officers confronted the suspect with incriminating evidence, (e) the suspect’s race and ethnicity, and (f) the totality of all circumstances weighed together. The criminal defense attorneys at Blair & Kim understand how to present this evidence effectively in King County, Pierce County, and Snohomish County courts.

Does an Earlier Miranda Violation Taint Later Statements?

Not necessarily under current federal law, but the answer may be different under Washington’s state constitution in the future. In Magana-Arevalo, the court held that the defendant’s December 1 statements were obtained through unconstitutional custodial interrogation. But it also held that the December 3 statements—made voluntarily and without custody two days later at the defendant’s home—were not tainted by the earlier violation under federal constitutional law, following the general rule from Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).

However, two concurrences signaled that this issue is not settled under Washington’s state constitution. Justice Yu’s concurrence (joined by Justices Whitener and Mangia) argued that article I, section 9 of the Washington Constitution should provide stronger protection than the Fifth Amendment and called for future litigants to brief the issue of an independent state exclusionary rule. Justice González’s concurrence in part and dissent in part (joined by Justice Montoya-Lewis) went further, arguing that the December 3 statement should have been suppressed under the state constitution because the follow-up interview was “in every meaningful way simply a continuation of the first.”

For defense practitioners, this means that in cases where police obtain an initial statement through a Miranda violation and then return for a follow-up interview, raising a state constitutional challenge under article I, section 9 is now a viable strategy—and one that at least five justices appear receptive to in the right case. Defense attorneys should specifically brief the state constitutional issue at the trial court level to preserve it for appellate review. Justice Yu’s concurrence expressly invited future litigants to do so, and Justice González’s opinion provided a framework for arguing that a follow-up interview exploiting an earlier violation constitutes compelled self-incrimination under Washington’s constitution.

What Is the Clarified Harmless Error Test?

When a trial court admits evidence in violation of the constitution, the conviction can stand only if the State proves the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Before Magana-Arevalo, Washington courts sometimes described this test in conflicting ways—some opinions focused only on whether the untainted evidence was “overwhelming,” while others asked whether the error “contributed” to the verdict. The Supreme Court clarified that the correct test considers both prongs together: the reviewing court must weigh the strength of the properly admitted evidence alongside the corrosive impact of the improperly admitted evidence.

This matters for defense attorneys because it prevents appellate courts from simply pointing to strong evidence of guilt and ignoring how prejudicial the improperly admitted evidence was. Mark Blair, a former prosecutor who has handled over 15,000 criminal cases in Washington courts and serves as a Judge Pro Tem at Lakewood Municipal Court, understands how harmless error analysis plays out on appeal and structures trial-level objections to preserve these issues for review.

Talk to an Experienced Seattle Criminal Defense Attorney

Magana-Arevalo reinforces that what officers say during an encounter matters far less than what they do. If you were physically restrained, separated from family, transported to a police location, or subjected to interrogation under coercive circumstances—even if officers told you that you were free to leave—your statements may have been obtained in violation of Miranda. Blair & Kim’s criminal defense team brings a former prosecutor’s insight to every case across King County, Pierce County, and Snohomish County courts.

To discuss your criminal case with an experienced Seattle defense attorney, call Blair & Kim at (206) 622-6562 or contact the firm online.

What Did the Court Decide in Wasuge?

The court addressed two issues. First, it held that even if a toxicology expert’s testimony about the American Medical Association’s recommended 0.05 percent BAC threshold was improperly admitted in an “affected by” DUI prosecution, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of impairment. Second — and more broadly significant — the court held that race and ethnicity are relevant factors that courts may objectively consider under the “totality of the circumstances” test when analyzing whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes.

What Did the Court Decide in Thiess?

The Court of Appeals reversed a trial court’s order requiring joint decision-making between two parents who had both been found to have committed domestic violence. The mother had a history of physical domestic violence, and the father had a history of emotional domestic violence as defined under RCW 7.105.010. Despite those findings, the trial court ordered joint decision-making, reasoning that restricting both parents did not make “common sense.”

Division One disagreed. The court held that former RCW 26.09.191(1) uses mandatory language — “shall not require mutual decision-making” — and that the statute applies when any parent has a history of domestic violence. The court remanded the case and ordered the trial court to assign sole decision-making authority to one parent.

Importantly, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision to allow equal residential time (a 50/50 week-on, week-off schedule), finding that the evidence supported the exception under former RCW 26.09.191(2)(n) because neither parent’s conduct had been shown to impact the child.

Why Does This Ruling Matter for Washington Custody Cases?

This decision clarifies a question that trial courts across Washington have wrestled with: what happens when both parents have domestic violence findings? Before Thiess, some trial courts — like the one in this case — reasoned that mutual findings essentially cancel each other out, allowing joint decision-making to proceed. The Court of Appeals has now made clear that reasoning is legally incorrect.

Under former RCW 26.09.191(1), a trial court must award sole decision-making to one parent whenever there is a domestic violence finding against any parent. The statute does not contain an exception for situations where both parents have findings. The family law attorneys at Blair & Kim handle high-conflict custody disputes involving domestic violence throughout King County, Pierce County, and Snohomish County, and this ruling reinforces the approach the firm’s attorneys have long advocated in these cases.

How Does This Affect Residential Time?

The Thiess ruling draws a clear distinction between decision-making and residential time under Washington law. While joint decision-making is flatly prohibited under former RCW 26.09.191(1) when there is a domestic violence finding, residential time restrictions operate differently.

Under former RCW 26.09.191(2), a court must limit a parent’s residential time if there is a domestic violence finding — but the statute provides an exception. The court may decline to impose residential restrictions if it finds either: (1) contact between the parent and child will not cause harm and the probability of recurring abuse is remote, or (2) the parent’s conduct did not impact the child.

In Thiess, the trial court made express findings that neither parent’s domestic violence had impacted the child, and the Court of Appeals upheld the 50/50 parenting schedule on that basis.

The practical takeaway: equal residential time remains possible even in cases with bilateral domestic violence findings, but joint decision-making is off the table.

What Should You Do If Your Case Involves Domestic Violence Findings?

If you are involved in a custody dispute where domestic violence has been alleged or found against one or both parents, Thiess has direct implications for your parenting plan. Here is what to consider:

If you are seeking sole decision-making authority: This ruling strengthens your position. If the court finds a history of domestic violence by the other parent — whether physical, emotional, or both — joint decision-making is prohibited as a matter of law. Your attorney should ensure the court makes specific findings under RCW 26.09.191(1) and orders sole decision-making to you.

If both parents have domestic violence findings: The court must still award sole decision-making to one parent. The court retains broad discretion to decide which parent receives that authority, and it may consider factors like the nature and severity of each parent’s conduct, the child’s best interests, and the overall parenting history. The court may also require the decision-making parent to provide advance notice of major decisions so the other parent can seek court intervention if needed.

If you want to preserve residential time: Even with domestic violence findings, 50/50 residential time is not automatically off the table. Your attorney will need to present evidence supporting the RCW 26.09.191(2)(n) exception — specifically, that the conduct did not impact the child or that future harm is remote.

Does This Ruling Apply to Cases Already in Progress?

The Thiess opinion was filed on January 26, 2026, and is an unpublished decision from Division One of the Washington Court of Appeals. Under Washington court rules, unpublished opinions are not binding precedent but may be cited under GR 14.1(c). The court itself cited prior unpublished decisions (In re Z.C., In re Yorks, In re Tullis) in reaching its conclusion, signaling a consistent line of appellate reasoning on this issue.

For parties with pending custody cases in King County Superior Court, Snohomish County Superior Court, or Pierce County Superior Court, this opinion provides persuasive authority that can be raised in motions and at trial. If your existing parenting plan includes joint decision-making and there are domestic violence findings, you may also have grounds to seek a modification.

Talk to a Seattle Family Law Attorney About Your Parenting Plan

Domestic violence findings create mandatory restrictions on parenting plans under Washington law, and Thiess confirms that those restrictions apply even when both parents have findings. Blair & Kim’s family law team has handled cases involving domestic violence, protection orders, and contested parenting plans across King County courts for more than two decades. The firm’s dual expertise in family law and criminal defense is particularly valuable in cases where DV allegations overlap with criminal charges and civil protection orders.

To discuss how this ruling may affect your custody case, call Blair & Kim at (206) 622-6562 or contact the firm online.

The plaintiff, “John Doe,” and “Jane Roe” each filed student conduct complaints against each other following a sexual encounter on an Arizona university campus.  Jane filed a Title IX complaint against John and he was found responsible for sexual misconduct.  He sued the university against the university’s Board of Regents and several individual defendants alleging violation of Title IX, violations of 42 U.S.C.  § 1983 and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The defendants argued the plaintiff had not established a plausible inference of sex-based discrimination.

A plaintiff alleging a Title IX claim must allege they were excluded from participating in, denied the benefits of or discriminated against under an educational program or activity on the basis of sex at a school receiving federal funding.  At the motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiff must only allege sufficient facts to state a claim that is facially plausible, but sex discrimination does not have to be the only plausible explanation.

In previous cases, the Ninth Circuit has considered “allegations of background indicia of sex discrimination,” including pressure on the university regarding how it handled sexual misconduct complaints and “a pattern of gender-based decisionmaking,” The court then considers the specific allegations regarding the disciplinary action against the plaintiff.  Schwake v. Arizona Bd. of Regents.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants had a history of investigation by the Department of Education regarding its Title IX investigations, including two complaints and investigations that were “contemporaneous” with the incident. He also alleged that most of the sexual misconduct reports in 2023 were allegations by females against males.  He also alleged that the university had a history of students alleging they had not sufficiently addressed sexual misconduct when it was reported.  Furthermore, he alleged there had been ongoing protests and that the university had given in to demands by “female alleged victims and survivors.”

The court noted that the plaintiff’s allegations were similar to those in Schwake, in which the Ninth Circuit held the plaintiff had established background indicia of sex discrimination.  The district court in this case therefore also found that the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently established a background indicia of sex discrimination.

The defendants argued the plaintiff had not alleged specific facts showing sex discrimination.

The plaintiff alleged he and Jane Roe each filed conduct complaints against each other.  He further alleged the university closed the complaint against him quickly because it realized it fell under Title IX, but his conduct complaint against her, based on the same type of conduct, was not closed.  He alleged Jane was given “clear instructions” to file a Title IX complaint, but his conduct complaint was investigated for “physical harm” and “harassment” instead of sexual misconduct.  He alleged this process denied him the procedural protection afforded under Title IX. He argued his complaint was treated differently solely due to sex.

The plaintiff alleged an initial hearing found him not responsible for sexual misconduct, but Jane appealed and informed the university she would pursue both Title IX and Clery Act claims—which carry a potential fine of $69,733 per violation. . .” He alleged she also threatened to file complaints with the Department of Education. The appeal decision maker allowed a rehearing due to procedural irregularities.  The plaintiff alleged the decision maker was biased toward female complainants.  He also alleged he did not have an opportunity to object.  The plaintiff was found not responsible again after the rehearing.  He alleged that the university then allowed Jane another appeal, which was reviewed by the same decision maker.  He alleged he did not have an opportunity to object to the decision maker. He further alleged the decision maker ignored the investigator’s findings and found the plaintiff had committed sexual misconduct.  He alleged he was given a suspension for one year, with no meaningful opportunity to respond to the appeals.

The district court found the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged different treatment of his complaint as compared to Jane’s, a similarly-situated female complainant.  The court found his allegations were sufficient to support an inference there had been gender bias. He had also alleged the appeal decision-maker ignored evidence that was favorable to him, did not permit him to object to her review or findings, and reversed two prior findings he was not responsible.

The plaintiff’s allegations, if taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, were consistent with his allegations male respondents were treated differently in the university’s sexual misconduct disciplinary proceedings.  The court determined the plaintiff had plausibly alleged a Title IX claim and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss with regard to the Title IX claim.

The court did, however, dismiss the plaintiff’s state law claims and his § 1983 claim against the individual defendants as it related to alleged due process violations, but did not dismiss the § 1983 claim with regard to the alleged equal protection violations.

In this case, the contemporaneous complaints regarding the same incident helped support the plaintiff’s allegations of sex-based discrimination so that he can proceed with his case.  If you have been accused of sexual misconduct at school, an experienced Washington Title IX defense attorney can help protect your rights during the investigation and disciplinary process.  Schedule a consultation with Blair & Kim, PLLC, by calling (206) 622-6562.

The petitioner sought a vulnerable adult protection order  as attorney for a woman who was over 80 years old and had dementia and other health issues.  She alleged the respondent had “abandoned, abused, financially exploited, or neglected” the woman, identifying specific incidents.  The petition alleged the respondent had taken the woman from her retirement community to her former home twice, which upset her when she learned the place had been rented.  The petitioner also alleged the respondent had given the woman alcohol twice when he was aware she had issues with alcohol abuse.  The petitioner provided declarations from herself, the woman’s brother, another of the woman’s relatives, and an agent with a durable power of attorney.

The respondent submitted his own declaration, transcripts of calls with the woman, and two character reference letters.

The court issued a temporary protection order and appointed a guardian ad litem.

Following  a virtual hearing, the commissioner entered a four-year vulnerable adult protection order.  The commissioner based the determination the woman was “ a vulnerable adult—cognitively and physically” on the guardian ad litem’s report, the declarations, and the testimony.  The commissioner found the respondent posted a credible threat to the woman and that his actions “created unsafe conditions for [her].”

The respondent appealed.

The appeals court noted the parties disputed the applicable burden of proof.  The respondent argued that the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence standard should apply to a vulnerable adult protection order when the protected person objects.  He argued that “a heightened standard of proof is required.”

The petitioner argued that the commissioner should have applied a preponderance of the evidence standard following the revision to RCW 7.105.225. The appeals court determined that RCW 7.105.225 was “unambiguous” and the preponderance of the evidence standard applied.  The appeals court did, however, suggest that the court forms be updated to reflect the change.

The respondent argued there was insufficient evidence supporting the court’s finding of “abandonment, abuse, financial exploitation, or neglect.” The appeals court noted he had not challenged the finding the protected person was a vulnerable adult or the finding that his actions created unsafe conditions for her.  The appeals court therefore only had to determine if there was substantial evidence supporting the “ultimate finding regarding abandonment, abuse, financial exploitation, or neglect.”

The appeals court looked to the statutory definition of “abuse” and determined there was evidence the respondent’s actions constituted mental abuse. The declarations of the petitioner and the woman’s relatives stated the respondent’s actions had created hostility between the woman and her family, resulting in her isolation.  The vulnerable adult protection order stated he “interfered with her family and legal relationships.” The appeals court also noted that the respondent’s actions in providing the woman alcohol or access to alcohol was evidence of physical abuse.  The petitioner’s declaration stated the woman had “a history of alcohol abuse” and that she had alcohol poisoning after being found on the Seattle University campus two days after the respondent visited her.  The court found the petitioner “has supplied alcohol.” The appeals court concluded there was substantial evidence establishing two separate grounds to support the court’s finding of abandonment, abuse, financial exploitation, or neglect. The appeals court found no abuse of discretion in the commissioner’s ruling.

The respondent argued the court abused its discretion by failing to consider his evidence.  The appeals court acknowledged the respondent’s evidence was not expressly listed in the vulnerable adult protection order, but pointed out the commissioner had expressly stated he reviewed all the materials provided by the parties.  Additionally, the evidence listed in the vulnerable adult protection order was the evidence the commissioner relied on.  The appeals court noted that the fact the respondent’s evidence was not included in the list indicated the commissioner had not credited it, not that he did not consider it.

The respondent also argued that the order was not a “tailored, proportional response” and exceeded the court’s authority.  The petitioner argued the guardian ad litem had concluded a “total prohibition on contact. . . was the best solution.” The appeals court noted the guardian ad litem had expressly recommended the court prohibit the respondent from all contact with the protected person. The woman’s brother’s declaration stated he had tried to talk to the respondent “many times” and her other relative said she had changed the woman’s phone number and blocked the respondent.  The petitioner testified about the respondent’s efforts to contact the protect person after she got new phone numbers.

The appeals court concluded the evidence established that the protected person’s attorney and family had tried to limit contact, but the respondent still tried to make contact.  The trial court based the vulnerable adult protective order on the facts presented and the appeals court found no error.

The appeals court affirmed the order.

Whether you are seeking or opposing a civil protection order, a knowledgeable Washington civil protection order can help.  Set up a consultation with Blair & Kim, PLLC by calling (206) 622-6562.