Summary: Player appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 former section 1170.95, (now section 1172.6). In his last appeal, the Courtheld substantial evidence did not support the resentencing court’s finding defendant aided and abetted murder and remanded for consideration of the alternative theories that defendant was the actual killer or a major participant in the underlying robbery acting with reckless disregard for human life. The resentencing court found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under both alternative theories, and therefore ineligible for resentencing.

On appeal, Player argues the jury’s findings at his trial collaterally estopped the resentencing court from finding he was the actual killer. The jury found not true allegations that defendant personally used a firearm and also found not true a robbery special circumstance that, as the jury was instructed, required a finding that defendant personally killed the victim. Player also argues substantial evidence did not support either the actual-killer or major participant/reckless indifference findings.

Summary : Newt appealed his felony conviction of receiving a large-capacity magazine (Pen. Code, § 32310, subd. (a)). He claimed that no substantial evidence supports the conviction; the jury was erroneously instructed on the crime; and the statute is unconstitutional.

The statute’s use of the terms “receives” and “possesses” are at issue here.  Subdivision (a) of section 32310 provides that any person who “receives” a large-capacity magazine commits a crime punishable as a felony or misdemeanor. Subdivision (c) provides that any person who “possesses” a large-capacity magazine also commits a crime, but that crime is punishable only as a misdemeanor or infraction. (§ 32310, subd. (c).) Newt acknowledges the prosecution presented evidence that he “possessed” a large-capacity magazine—that an assault rifle with a large-capacity magazine was found on the front seat of the car he was driving while he attempted to avoid a traffic stop and from which he subsequently fled. But he asserts the prosecution presented no evidence beyond mere “possession” and therefore his conviction for felony “receiving” the large-capacity magazine cannot stand. He argues the jury was not properly instructed on the distinction between “receiving” and “possessing” such a magazine.

Summary: Chi appealed the trial court’s denial of his petition for a writ of mandate challenging the suspension of his driving privileges by the Department of Motor Vehicles. Chi asserted that the department’s administrative hearing officer violated his due process rights by acting as a prosecutor rather than a neutral adjudicator. The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed.

The California Supreme Court granted review in a similar case, Romane v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1002, 1019, 1021, 332 Cal.Rptr.3d 104, review granted August 13, 2025, S291093 (Romane). Romane is part of a line of recent involving the DMV—that examine this same due process issue. Some of these cases conflict with the Supreme Court’s precedent by employing an appearance of bias standard for assessing an adjudicator’s impartiality and by overlooking the presumption of impartiality that courts afford to adjudicators.

Summary: A police officer’s decision to impound a driver’s vehicle pursuant to the Vehicle Code solely to prevent further illegal driving does not satisfy the community caretaking function.

Perez pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). The police found drugs in Perez’s vehicle during an impoundment and inventory search following a traffic stop. The police also found a firearm and more drugs when later executing a search warrant on a hotel room linked to Perez.

Summary: Valencia, under the influence of methamphetamine and cocaine, drove his pickup truck and would not comply with police orders to pull over. Police chased Valencia until he crashed into a parked car. Valencia jumped out, ran to his nearby apartment, and barricaded himself in his bedroom. During an overnight standoff, Valencia shot one officer to death and seriously wound another. A SWAT team eventually blew through his bedroom wall and blasted down his bedroom door. The jury convicted Valencia of murder and other felonies.

Valencia appealed challenging the warrantless entry of police into his apartment. The Court of Appeal held that jurors could find exigent circumstances justified the initial warrantless entry and that police did not need to seek a warrant once they were in the apartment.

Summary: Penal Code section 1001.36 authorizes a court to grant pretrial diversion to a defendant with a qualifying mental disorder who agrees to comply with mental health treatment (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(3)) and will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety “if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)

The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged Taylor with several counts of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon, alleging Taylor viciously attacked four individuals with a metal pipe. The defense moved for mental health diversion to a community facility, supported by a psychological evaluation that Taylor suffered a treatable schizoaffective disorder but would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety “if his psychiatric symptoms were controlled with treatment.”

Summary: During a confrontation with law enforcement, Morgan aimed a firearm at police officers, “racked” its slide, and pulled the trigger. The weapon did not discharge and when officers eventually recovered it, it was unloaded. Defendant was convicted of resisting an officer by “the use of force or violence” under Penal Code section 69, subdivision (a).  On appeal of his conviction, he argues  that assault (§ 240) is a lesser included offense of resisting an officer by force or violence. Because there was no evidence the weapon was loaded, he could not be convicted of assault and therefore could not be convicted of resisting an officer under section 69, subdivision (a) (section 69(a)).

The California Supremd Court concluded that assault is not a lesser included offense of resisting an officer by force or violence. Resisting  by force or violence does not require the “present ability” (§ 240) to commit a violent injury, an essential element of assault. s this interpretation.

Summary: Flores pleaded no contest to felony possession of fentanyl for sale and was sentenced to two years of formal probation with a condition permitting warrantless searches of Flores’s electronic devices. On appeal, Flores asked the court to strike or modify the electronics search clause as unconstitutionally overbroad and unreasonable. Because Flores used electronic devices to coordinate the sale and to obscure his identity during negotiations, the court affirmed  the electronics search clause in its entirety.

In its presentencing report, the probation department recommended “a five-way search clause to include all electronic devices, and supply passwords upon request due to [Flores] using his cell phone to negotiate the sale of illicit controlled substances.” The report  stated that at the time of the offense, Flores had been on formal probation in Merced for possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), and that Flores admitted to using fentanyl and a prior gang affiliation.

Summary: A “Perkins operation” is when an undercover operative is placed in a cell with the suspect to obtain information from the suspect. The term derives its name from Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (Perkins).

During a Perkins operation, Zapata admitted to two undercover officers that he murdered Justin Triplett. A jury who heard a recording of Zapata’s confession convicted Zapata of second degree murder. On appeal, Zapata argues the trial court’s admission of his statements violated Miranda because he had invoked his right to an attorney, he did not waive that right when he spoke with the undercover agents, and the involvement of a known law enforcement officer transformed the operation into a custodial interrogation. The Court of Appeal agreed.

Summary: The Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel applies in state criminal trials. (Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S.) That right is violated when a judge communicates with a jury during deliberations “without affording defendant and counsel an opportunity to be present.  (People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 69. (Hawthorne).)

Here, the trial court judge sent the judicial assistant, (the JA), into the jury room to speak to the jury about the foreperson’s (Juror No. 4’s) note describing the jurors’ collective concern that a juror (Juror No. 15) did not speak English sufficiently to deliberate and had already made up his mind (the Note). The trial judge did not inquire of the jury or inform trial counsel of the Note’s existence. The JA’s conversations about the Note with the jury were not transcribed.