Atlanta Divorce Attorney Blog

Grandparent visitation rights in Georgia

Fri, 03 Feb 2012 10:02:36 -0600

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently heard an interesting case regarding visitation rights for grandparents whose son’s parental rights had been terminated. Kunz v. Bailey, S11G0867 (2012). In that case, the child’s stepfather adopted the child after the biological father’s rights were terminated. Id. After being denied access to the child, the paternal grandparents (parents of the biological father whose rights were terminated), petitioned for visitation rights with the child. Id. Under Georgia law, a petition for grandparent visitation is not authorized where “the parents of the minor child are not separated and the child is living with both of the parents.” OCGA §19-7-3(b). Therefore, the child’s mother and adoptive father (“Parents”) moved to dismiss the action and, after the motion was denied, filed a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Id. at 2. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of the Parents’ motion to dismiss, determining that the term “parent” in the grandparent visitation statute “was not limited to natural parents, but included adoptive parents as well.” Id.

The grandparents then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court of Georgia to determine whether the language of the grandparent visitation statute cited above includes adoptive parents. Id. at 3. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the statute did include adoptive parents. Any other interpretation would “allow grandparents, by court action, to intrude upon the ‘constitutionally protected interest of parents to raise their children.'” Id. at 4, quoting Brooks v. Parkerson, 265 Ga. 189, 191 (1995). In addition, there was no limiting language in the statute that distinguished between any class of parents. Kunz, at 4.

The Court also agreed that the trial court’s denial of the original motion to dismiss was error. Since the adoptive father was the father of the child at the time the grandparent visitation was filed and the child was living with both parents, there was no basis for an original action for visitation by the grandparents. Id. at 5. Thus, dismissal of the grandparents’ visitation petition “was the proper outcome.” Id.

Termination of parental rights in Georgia when father is not on birth certificate

Mon, 30 Jan 2012 10:00:05 -0600

As a Georgia family law attorney, I was recently asked how parental rights could be terminated for a father who is not on the child’s birth certificate. Generally, if you are not married and the father is not on the birth certificate, the father has no rights in Georgia so there is nothing to terminate. In a situation such as this, the father has to file a Legitimation action and ask a Court to grant him rights. If you object to the father being granted any parental rights, it would be at this point where you would contest the granting of the Legitimation.

By Patrick L. Meriwether, Partner, Meriwether & Tharp, LLC

Georgia high income child support deviation

Fri, 27 Jan 2012 09:58:03 -0600

With the increasing publicity related to celebrities and their custody disputes (Usher, T.O., Mindy McCready and other artists we have posted about), an interesting question arises as to how judges in Georgia handle child support obligations when one parent makes a significantly higher income than the other parent. The purpose of child support is to provide the minor child with a lifestyle that reflects the income of both parents. What do you do when one parent makes ten times, twenty times, or even one hundred times more?

I recently attended a seminar where a panel of judges discussed this issue. A Gwinnet County judge indicated that lump sum child support might be appropriate. Lump sum child support is usually one large payment that, once paid, would completely resolve the parent’s obligation to pay child support in the future. The benefit to lump sum child support would be ensuring that the entire child support obligation until the minor child turns eighteen would have already been paid even if the high-income parent were to lose his or her job later. However, if the high income earning parent were to lose his or her job later, an argument could be made that the lump sum child support was inappropriate because that parent would have had to pay a lower child support payment if his or her income were lower.

A Cobb County judge suggested that another way to determine child support in high-income cases is to use percentages. By way of example, if the child support payment should be 15% of the parent’s net income, then it should not matter whether the 15% is applied to an income of $40,000.00 or $400,000.00 or $4,000,000.00. A Fulton County judge stated that her main concern in such cases is that the money is put to good use and be used for the minor child rather than going to the living expenses of the other parent. This Fulton County judge stated that, depending on the case, it may be in the best interest of the child to require that a certain sum be set for the minor child and defer accessibility to that fund so the custodial parent does not waste it. Another judge stated, however, that just because one parent earns a significantly higher income than the other does not mean that the child support obligation should be significantly higher as well. This judge wanted to prevent the situation where the custodial parent was essentially “winning the lottery” through child support and stated that a downward deviation is appropriate.

By Emily Yu, Associate Attorney, Meriwether & Tharp, LLC

Self-executing visitation provision in Georgia divorce held invalid

Mon, 23 Jan 2012 13:37:08 -0600

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently heard a case regarding a self-executing modification in a final decree of divorce. Johnson v. Johnson, S11F1856 (2012). In that divorce case, the final decree of divorce awarded primary physical custody of the parties’ daughter to the mother, with supervised visitation to the father. Id. The parenting plan further provided that the father’s overnight visitation must be supervised by “a reasonable adult approved by [a therapist treating the child], until such time as [the therapist] determines that supervision is not necessary.” Id. Under the parenting plan, the therapist had the additional authority “to determine how supervised visitation should be phased out over time and when supervision may end.” Id. The father appealed, contending that the “provisions concerning the termination of the supervised visitation constituted an improper self-executing modification contingent on the determination of the therapist.” Id. at 2.

The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed with the father that the provision is an improper self-executing change of visitation because it allows for an automatic change in his visitation based on a future event, without any additional judicial scrutiny. Id. at 2-3. The Court held that “a self-executing change in custody/visitation that constitutes a material change, i.e. is one ‘that is allowable only upon a determination that it is in the best interests of the [child] at the time of the change,’ generally violates Georgia’s public policy founded on the best interests of the child.” Id. at 3. The responsibility for making this decision must be made by the court and cannot be delegated to another person or entity. Id. In this case, the provision regarding the change in the father’s visitation is considered a material change. Since, under this provision, it will occur automatically without any judicial scrutiny, “it is an invalid self-executing change of visitation” and must be stricken from the final divorce judgment. Id. at 4.

Custody awarded to father in Georgia divorce case despite evidence of alleged family violence

Fri, 20 Jan 2012 13:32:41 -0600

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently affirmed a divorce action where the husband was awarded primary physical custody of the children despite evidence of alleged family violence. Finklea v. Finklea, S11F1804 (2012). At the final hearing in that divorce case, the parties “each testified extensively about acts of family violence committed by the other spouse, which led to multiple police reports filed against each other.” Id. at 2. In its final judgment, the trial court said it was making its decision “[a]fter hearing testimony of the parties and considering all the evidence tendered at trial.” Id. Neither party asked for written findings of fact supporting the custody award. Id. The trial court ultimately awarded primary physical custody to the husband.

The wife appealed, alleging that “in awarding primary physical custody of the parties’ two children to Husband, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to cosider evidence of alleged family violence perpetrated by Husband against her." Id. at 1. The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed, holding that, under the circumstances described above, the trial court did consider evidence of family violence presented at the final hearing. Id. at 3. In addition, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of primary physical custody to the husband. The trial court exercised its discretion in awarding custody to one parent over the other and “[w]here there is any evidence to support the decision of the trial court, this Court cannot say there was an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 3, quoting Haskell v. Haskell, 286 Ga. 112, 112 (2009).

In Georgia, trial court cannot rely on evidence from temporary hearing in making final judgment

Mon, 16 Jan 2012 13:27:14 -0600

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently reversed a trial court’s decision in a custody modification case because the trial court erroneously relied on evidence from the temporary hearing in making its final custody determination. Vaughn v. Davis, S11A1950 (2012). In that case, the parties had been granted joint legal and physical custody of their children in their divorce action. Neither was required to pay child support to the other, but they were ordered to split the children’s expenses. Id. The mother later filed a motion for change of custody and child support. Id. At the temporary hearing at which both parties appeared pro se, the trial court entered a temporary order awarding primary physical custody to the father, with the visitation to the mother. The mother was also ordered to pay child support to the father. Id.

The mother retained an attorney prior to the final hearing in the case. At the final hearing, the trial court again granted primary physical custody to the father, with visitation for the mother. Id. at 2. After her motion for a new trial was denied, the mother appealed, contending “that the trial court erred by relying on evidence adduced at the temporary hearing.” Id.

The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed with the mother, citing a case from 2010 which held that “[t]he nature and quality of the evicence presented at a temporary hearing is likely to be different than that which is ultimately presented at the final hearing, and parties should ordinarily expect that only that evidence which their opponent sees fit to offer at the final, more formal hearing will be relied on to support the permanent custody award…Accordingly, we now hold that, absent express notice to the parties, it is error for a trial court to rely on evidence from the temporary hearing in making its final custody determination.” Id. at 2-3, quoting Pace v. Pace, 287 Ga. 899, 901 (2010).

Here, it is clear that the trial court relied on evidence from the temporary hearing in reaching its final custody decision, and “there is no indication that the parties were notified in advance that this was going to happen.” Vaughn at 3. Thus, the trial court’s order must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Residence requirements for divorce in Georgia

Fri, 13 Jan 2012 13:44:19 -0600

In Georgia, when spouses live in different counties, or if one spouse lives in Georgia and one lives out of state, there are specific rules which govern where the divorce action must be filed. Georgia law states that: “No court shall grant a divorce to any person who has not been a bone fide resident of this state for six months before the filing of the petition for divorce.” OCGA §19-5-2. An exception to this rule is that “a nonresident of this state may file a petition for divorce, in the county of the residence of the respondent, against any person who has been a resident of this state and of the county in which the action is brought for a period of six months prior to the filing of the petition.” Id.

If both parties have resided in Georgia for more than six months, the Petitioner must file the divorce action in the county in which the Respondent resides, even if the Petitioner does not live in that county. So, if the Petitioner resides in Fulton County and the Respondent resides in Cobb County, the divorce action must be filed in Cobb County. If the Petitioner resides out of state and the Respondent has resided in Georgia for at least six months, the divorce action must be filed in the Georgia county in which the Respondent resides. If the Petitioner resides in Georgia and the Respondent resides out of state, the divorce action cannot be filed in Georgia but, rather, must be filed in the state in which the Respondent resides.

Pension plans and divorce in Georgia

Mon, 09 Jan 2012 13:41:35 -0600

Atlanta divorce attorneys are often asked how pension plans are divided upon a divorce in Georgia. In general, pension plans are treated like any other property – if they accrued during the marriage, they are marital property subject to equitable division. Any portion that accrued prior to the marriage, however, is considered the separate property of that spouse.

Consider an example where a husband had a pension that began accruing in 1990, and the couple married in 1995 and divorced in 2005. In that situation, the wife would be entitled to an equitable portion of the pension that accrued from 1995 until 2005, but would not be entitled to anything from 1990 to 1995 as that portion would be the husband’s separate property.

Dividing pensions and other retirement accounts in a divorce can be complicated. Many companies have very specific regulations that must be followed and precise language that must be used in the divorce decree in order for the account to be divided. If you are dealing with one of these accounts in your divorce action, we recommend that you contact one of our Atlanta divorce attorneys for assistance to ensure a smooth division of these assets.

Assisted reproductive technologies and family law in Georgia

Fri, 06 Jan 2012 12:47:56 -0600

In Georgia, as well as around the world, conceiving a child with the use of assisted reproductive technologies can bring up and/or complicate custody issues in a divorce or other family law case. With the ongoing developments in medicine and the reproductive sciences, more couples turn to assisted reproductive technologies to conceive children. Medical and technical advances are providing new ways to become parents which have never been imagined by previous generations. As people turn to options like intrauterine insemination, in vitro fertilization, surrogacy, or freezing sperm, eggs, or embryos for future use, a host of legal questions arise as to ownership, possession and control. For example, does frozen sperm remain the property of the Father or, because it has been frozen and has an intended purpose, is the sperm transformed into property of the Father and Mother?

It is very important to have a written and detailed agreement documenting each party’s intentions prior to entering into any third-party assisted reproduction arrangement. While a couple may enter the process with intentions to stay married or to raise their children together, it is hard to predict whether a couple may separate or be divorced in the future. An agreement should contemplate what would occur in the event the couple separates or gets a divorce. Will someone keep the frozen embryos? Who will be responsible for the costs associated with storing the embryos until future use? For how long will they be stored?

This is just the beginning when it comes to the questions and scenarios that parties must consider prior to entering a third-party assisted reproduction arrangement. If you are considering assisted reproductive technologies or have already used assisted reproductive technologies and are now contemplating a divorce, please contact one of our Atlanta Divorce Attorneys.

By Emily Yu, Associate Attorney, Meriwether & Tharp LLC

Can I get a divorce online in Georgia?

Mon, 02 Jan 2012 09:51:26 -0600

In these tough economic times, people are often looking for ways to save money. So it is not surprising that Georgia divorce attorneys are often asked if a person can obtain a divorce online, rather than hire an attorney and go through the court system.

In Georgia, you cannot get a divorce online. You can obtain the divorce paperwork online, but you must file it with the Superior Court, who will then grant your divorce after going through the required legal procedure. Some counties offer help with divorce filings and make it easier than others to file and obtain a divorce without an attorney. However, there are some aspects of a divorce case, particularly child custody and child support, that require specific legal documents (i.e. parenting plan, child support worksheets) that must be filled out correctly and completely before the court will grant the divorce, even if all issues are agreed upon. Thus, while there is certainly nothing wrong with negotiating issues in your divorce without the assistance of at attorney, it might actually save you time and money to hire an attorney to help you with the paperwork to ensure it is done correctly and that there will be no issues in having your divorce granted as expeditiously as possible.

In Georgia, am I legally separated after I file my divorce action?

Fri, 30 Dec 2011 09:47:44 -0600

Georgia divorce attorneys are often asked whether the filing of a divorce action means the parties are legally separated. This question often comes from people who are interested in starting to date other people during the pending divorce.

Please keep in mind that Georgia does not recognize legal separation. Therefore, nothing changes about your marital status until your final divorce decree has been signed by the Judge. Until you receive your final divorce decree, you are still married in the eyes of the law and sex with anyone who is not your spouse is considered adultery. Whether this adultery is considered to be the cause of your divorce is a different question. It is important to note, however, that the Judge can take your actions both before and during the pending divorce action into consideration in awarding alimony, custody, and equitable division of assets.

Prenuptial agreement upheld in Georgia divorce case

Mon, 26 Dec 2011 09:12:20 -0600

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently heard an appeal of a divorce case, which highlights the security, or risk (depending on which side you are on), of entering into a prenuptial agreement in Georgia. Sides v. Sides, S11F1140 (2011). In that case, the parties began dating in 1989 and, shortly thereafter, the Wife became pregnant. Id. Due to the great disparity in assets and income between the parties, they negotiated and signed a prenuptial agreement before marrying in 1990. Id. Under the agreement, “Wife would have been entitled to substantially more resources if the parties divorced after their twenty-year anniversary, and substantially less if the parties divorced prior to their twenty year anniversary.” Id. at 2. Nearly twenty years later, the Husband filed a Compliant for Divorce and Motion to Enforce the Prenuptial Agreement, which the trial court granted a mere 62 days prior to the couple’s twenty year anniversary, and the WIfe appealed. Id.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the enforcement of the prenuptial agreement. The Court first laid out the factors to be considered by the trial court in deciding the validity of the prenuptial agreement: “(1) [W]as the agreement obtained through fraud, duress or mistake, or through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts? (2) [I]s the agreement unconscionable? (3) Have the facts and circumstances changed since the agreement was executed, so as to make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable?” Id., quoting Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 641 (3) (1982).

In this case, both attorneys “deposed that they would not have allowed their clients to enter the agreement without full financial disclosures being made,” and Wife was long aware of the “vast disparity” between their incomes. Id. at 3. Thus, the evidence supported that full financial disclosures were made prior to signing and the agreement was not unconscionable. In addition, the increase in Husband’s net worth was anticipated and, therefore, it was not a “change of circumstance that would make the enforcement of the agreement unfair and unreasonable.” Id. at 4. The trial court, thus, did not abuse its discretion in upholding the prenuptial agreement.

Primary custody awarded to one parent in Georgia even where both are deemed fit parents

Fri, 23 Dec 2011 09:08:37 -0600

In Georgia, even in divorce cases with two fit parents, one parent will be awarded primary physical custody. In a recent divorce case with two fit parents, the trial court awarded primary physical custody of the parties’ two minor children to the Wife, and the Husband appealed. Rowden v. Rowden, S11F0812 (2011).

In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the Supreme Court of Georgia stated that: “In a contest between parents over the custody of a child [or children], the trial court has very broad discretion, looking always to the best interest of the child[ren], and may award the child[ren] to one even though the other may not be an unfit person to exercise custody or had not otherwise lost the right to custody.” Id. at 2, quoting LaFont v. Rouviere, 283 Ga. 60, 62 (2) (2008). Here, the trial court found that both parents were fit and spent quality time with the children. Id. at 3. However, “Husband did not have a concrete childcare plan for the children, nor did he engage his children in age-appropriate activities with other children that could have assisted in their social development. Wife, on the other hand, got the children involved in summer camps, lived near her own parents (who could help her with the children), and, unlike Husband, planned social events for the children such as birthday parties.” Id. The Supreme Court of Georgia therefore held that the evidence supported the trial court’s decision to award primary physical custody to the mother.

It is important to note that the trial court was not saying that the father was not a fit or good parent. Rather, it relied on the evidence above to tip the scales in favor of the mother for primary physical custody.

Travel expenses deviation in Georgia - what is appropriate?

Mon, 19 Dec 2011 10:46:47 -0600

In Georgia, child support is calculated using the child support worksheets to obtain a presumptive child support amount, which can then be deviated from using several specified grounds. OCGA §19-6-15. One such deviation is the travel expenses deviation, which can be used to account for substantial travel costs incurred when the parents live in different cities or states. OCGA §19-6-15(i)(2)(F). In allowing this deviation, the court must consider “the circumstances of the respective parents as well as which parent moved and the reason for such move.” Id.

I recently attended a seminar where several Atlanta-based judges discussed this issue. The judges were consistent in stating that they would only grant this deviation for things that had been done in the past, not just things a party said he/she would do. For example, if an out of town parent previously only visited twice a year, it is unlikely that this parent would get a deviation for monthly travel expenses. In addition, the judges all agreed that if the distance between parents was great, they would be more likely to award travel expenses for fewer, longer visits (such as over winter break or summer) rather than short monthly visits, as this would be a better use of quality visitation time as well as travel expenses. Overall, the judges do not want to discourage visitation, but also do not want to encourage misuse of this deviation.

Parenting time deviation in Georgia - what is appropriate?

Fri, 16 Dec 2011 10:42:47 -0600

In Georgia, child support is calculated using the child support worksheets to obtain a presumptive child support amount, which can then be deviated from using several specified grounds. OCGA §19-6-15. One such deviation is the parenting time deviation which can apply “when special circumstances make the presumptive amount of child support excessive or inadequate due to extended parenting time as set forth in the order of visitation or when the child resides with both parents equally.” OCGA §19-6-15(i)(2)(K)(i). The statute, however, gives no guidelines for what the deviation should be.

I recently attended a seminar where several Atlanta-based judges discussed this issue using the example of a child who resides with each parent equally. One Fulton county judge stated that, even with equally shared visitation, if one parent makes significantly more money than the other, some child support should be paid to the other parent. Another Judge agreed, with the caveat that if the higher wage earner was paying other expenses such as day care and/or medical, this should count toward support and, thus, it is possible that no child support would be paid to the other parent. Thus, since it is in the discretion of the judge, it is likely that the deviation will vary depending on your county and your judge. All of the Judges believed, however, that, in this situation, the calculation should start with the presumptive child support amount and go down from there, rather than assuming there should be no child support paid.